

# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 22 May 03	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED SAMS Monograph 17 Jul02-22May 03	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Is a Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) a Viable Tool for U.S. Northern Command during Consequence Management Operations?			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) LTC Ramon Valle				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD 1 Reynolds Ave Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) <i>See attached</i>				
14. SUBJECT TERMS			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 64	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

20040213 060

# **Is a Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) a Viable Tool for U.S. Northern Command during Consequence Management Operations?**

**A Monograph**

**By**

**Lieutenant Colonel Ramon Valle**

**Infantry**



**School of Advanced Military Studies  
United States Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
First Term AY 02-03**

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPROVAL PAGE .....	ii
ABSTRACT.....	iii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS .....	iv
CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION .....	1
Research Question and Methodology .....	4
CHAPTER TWO. THE CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT ENVIRONMENT .....	9
Geographical and Regional Dynamics.....	9
The Area of Responsibility .....	9
The Federal Emergency Management Agency.....	11
The Continental United States Army .....	13
Political Realm: The Federal Response Plan .....	15
Emergency Support Functions .....	16
Military Support .....	18
Social Expectations .....	19
Legal Considerations .....	22
CHAPTER THREE. THE AUGMENTATION CELL .....	25
USPACOM Deployable JTF Augmentation Cell .....	27
USSOUTHCOM Deployable JTF Augmentation Cell.....	30
CHAPTER FOUR. HURRICANE ANDREW AND MITCH CASE STUDIES .....	34
Hurricane Andrew.....	34
Hurricane Mitch .....	41
Lessons Learned.....	46
CHAPTER FIVE. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....	49
Conclusion .....	49
Recommendations.....	51
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	57

**SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES**

**MONOGRAPH APPROVAL**

**LTC Ramon Valle**

**Title of Monograph:** Is a Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) a Viable Tool for U.S. Northern Command during Consequence Management Operations?

Approved by:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Peter J. Schifferle, Ph.D.

Monograph Director

\_\_\_\_\_  
Robert H. Berlin, Ph.D.

Professor and Director  
Academic Affairs,  
School of Advanced  
Military Studies

\_\_\_\_\_  
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate Degree  
Program

## ABSTRACT

Is a Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) a Viable Tool for U.S. Northern Command During Consequence Management Operations? By LTC Ramon Valle, USA, 54

This monograph examines the potentiality of creating a rapid deployable joint task force augmentation cell (DJTFAC) in the newly created United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to facilitate providing military support to civil authorities (MACA) during consequence management (CM) operations. It examines the complex domestic operational environment created by the interaction and friction of geography and regional dynamics, the political realm, social expectation, and legal constraints inherent to interagency operations at the federal, state, and local levels, while operating within NORTHCOM's AOR. The monograph introduces the concept of the Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) as an option for the combatant commander to facilitate CM operations of his standing or designated joint task forces. It uses the USPACOM and USSOUTHCOM models to illustrate the capabilities and limitations of this type of organizations.

Conducting case studies on JTF Andrew (which did not employ a DJTFAC) during relief operations in support of Hurricane Andrew (1992), and JTF Aguila (which employed a DJTFAC) in support of Hurricane Mitch (1998), the monograph compares and contrasts these operations examining lessons learned in the areas of flexibility, interoperability, and unity of effort, to assess if the employment of a DJTFAC enhanced effectiveness and efficiency during the JTF operations. The monograph concludes that the employment of a DJTFAC is a viable tool for NORTHCOM to enhance CM operations in support of a lead federal agency (LFA). The monograph presents a recommended design model, using a systems approach, taking into account the interaction of environment dynamics, purpose and function of the organization, and critical processes (organizational processes-creating synergy, throughput processes-operational efficiency, and latent processes-creation of potential) required to attained the desired output or endstate

## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE	PAGE
1. The World with Commanders' Areas of Responsibility .....	11
2. FEMA Regional Responsibilities.....	13
3. National Disaster Response Network .....	16
4. Federal Response Plan's Emergency Support System Functions .....	18
5. The MACA Operational Environment.....	24
6. USCINCPAC DJTFAC Task Organization.....	29
7. USSOUTHCOM DJTFAC Task Organization.....	31
8. JTF Andrew Task Organization.....	36
9. JTF Aguila Task Organization.....	42
10. NORTHCOM DJTFAC Design Process.....	53
11. NORTHCOM DJTFAC Design (Task Organization).....	56

## CHAPTER ONE

### Introduction

The new commander (NORTHCOM) will be responsible for land, aerospace and sea defenses of the United States. He will command U.S. forces that operate within the United States in support of civil authorities. The command will provide civil support not only in response to attacks, but for natural disasters.<sup>1</sup>

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld - Pentagon, 17 April 2002

The terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 changed America's perception of protection and security in the homeland. America's social and psychological landscape was transformed; an attack on our soil was no longer just a speculative and remote possibility, but a hard and ghastly reality that forever changed our perception of the nation's geostrategic security environment and internal vulnerabilities. The United States, however, showed enormous determination to fight this threat by declaring war on global terrorism, creating the Department of Homeland Security, and creating an unprecedented new military unified command.<sup>2</sup>

On 1 October 2002, United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) became the newest unified command within the Department of Defense with a geographical Area of Responsibility (AOR) and Title 10, United States (U.S.) Code authorities and responsibilities.<sup>3</sup> NORTHCOM has the unprecedented and formidable task of providing unity of command and control (C2) over all military efforts, across the operational spectrum, related to Homeland Security in the Continental United States

---

<sup>1</sup>Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Special Briefing on the Unified Command Plan," *DefenseLink News*, 17 April 2002 (on-line); available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002>; internet; accessed 1 October 2002.

<sup>2</sup>A unified command is a command with broad continuing missions under a single commander and composed of forces from two or more Military Departments and which is established by the President, through the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. DOD, *Joint Doctrine Capstone and Primer: Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)* (Washington, D.C., 2001), 18-19, and Jim Garamone, "US Northern Command to Debut in October," *American Forces Press Services* (Washington, D.C., 17 April 2002), 1.

<sup>3</sup>Legal Information Institute (LII): *U.S. Code Collection: United States Code, Title 10-Armed Forces, Part I-Organization and General Military Powers, Chapter 6, Combatant Commander* (Washington, D.C., n.d.) 161-168, (on-line); available from <http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/>; internet; accessed 20 December 2002.

(CONUS), Alaska, Canada, Mexico, portions of the Caribbean, and the surrounding waters out to approximately 500 nautical miles (NM).<sup>4</sup>

Since America's inception as a nation, the preoccupation with the security and defense of the homeland has always existed within the established government.<sup>5</sup> However, it is now, after September 11, that the rhetoric has changed to action, and security of the homeland has actually taken a leading role, becoming an urgent mission for the nation and the military's highest priority.<sup>6</sup> In this context, Homeland Security is a new-fashioned and complex mission encompassing the "prevention, preemption, and deterrence of, and defense against, aggression targeted at U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure as well as the management of the consequences of such aggression and other domestic emergencies."<sup>7</sup>

To appreciate the magnitude of this task it becomes necessary to put into context the two major components of Homeland Security (HLS): Homeland Defense (HLD) and Civil Support (CS). HLD refers to the protection of U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression. Conversely, CS relates to Department of Defense (DOD) support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated enforcement of other

---

<sup>4</sup>AOR is the geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. DOD, *Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C., 1994), 36.

<sup>5</sup>U.S. Constitution, Article 4, & 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the Legislature, or of the Executive {when the Legislature cannot be convened}, against domestic violence."). David E. Graham, *Domestic Operational Law (DOPLAW), Handbook for Judge Advocates* (Center for Law and Military Operations, Charlottesville, Virginia, 2001), 53.

<sup>6</sup>Referring to Homeland Security, President George W. Bush stated on July 10 2002: "But there is an overriding and urgent mission here in America today, and that's to protect our homeland. We have been called into action, and we've got to act." U.S. Northern Command Homepage (on-line); available from <http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?Fuseaction=s.whoweare&section=3>; accessed 18 December 2002. Furthermore, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated: "The Unified Command Plan (UCP) reflects this new defense strategy recognizing the defense of the United States as the military's highest priority." Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Special Briefing on the Unified Command Plan," The Pentagon, Washington, 17 Apr 02 (on-line); available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/t04172002/t0417sd.html>; internet; accessed 1 Oct 02.

<sup>7</sup>Definition of HLS found at DOD, United States Northern Command Homepage (on-line); available from <http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.homeland>; internet; accessed 19 December 2002, and Colonel Thomas La Crosse, *Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA): Directorate of Military Support (DOMS)*, PowerPoint presentation (Washington, D.C., n.d.), 36.



activities. After an incident, sorting out the "mess" is referred to as Consequence Management; it applies to both Homeland Defense and Civil Support.<sup>8</sup>

Consequence Management (CM) is one of the most critical support missions NORTHCOM will face in support of HLS. Mistakenly, the term "consequence management" is mostly associated with incidents involving only weapons of mass destruction (WMD); however, CM is a more encompassing concept. It entails providing support to restore and maintain those essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes.<sup>9</sup> Although, CM applies to both HLD and CS, it closely relates to the latter, as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the designated Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for CM in the United States.<sup>10</sup> For NORTHCOM, CM support is primarily managed as a function of CS, which includes providing military assistance to civil authorities (MACA) in according with Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3025.15.<sup>11</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Part of the confusion with the limited objective typically associated with the term consequence management (CM) is the definition provided in Joint Pub 1-02 (p. 95). It states that CM entails "those measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive situation." The term CM, in relation to WMD, was introduced into the national security lexicon with the promulgation of Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 in 1995. However, FEMA provides a more comprehensive definition of the term. CM critical services and activities may include supporting transportation, communication, public works and engineering, fire fighting, information sharing, mass care, resource support, health and medical services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials, food and energy, support to law enforcement, counterdrugs and counterterrorism. Chris, Seiple, "Consequence Management: Domestic Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction." US Army War College, *Parameters*, Autumn 1997 (journal on-line), 119-34; available from <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc://carlisle>; internet; accessed on 1 Oct 02.

<sup>10</sup>National Security Council, "Presidential Decision Directive (PPD) 39: US Policy on Counterterrorism, Appendix 6-2, (Washington, D.C., n.d.), 6-1 and *DOPLAW*, 129.

<sup>11</sup>DODD 3025.15 is the umbrella directive that governs the provision of all DOD military assistance to U.S. civil authorities. MACA missions include: Military Assistance to Civil Disturbance (MACDIS), Military Support to Civil Law Enforcement (MSCLE), Support to Counter Drug Operations (SCDO), Support to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, High-Yield Explosions (CBRNE), Sensitive Support (SS), and Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). The directive provides criteria against which all requests for support are evaluated. Criteria are Legality (compliance with the law), Lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DOD forces), Risk (safety of DOD forces), Cost (who pays, impact on DOD budget), and Appropriateness (whether it's in the interest of DOD to provide the requested support). *DOPLAW*, 3-4.

## Research Question and Methodology

This monograph focuses on CM as it relates to MACA; it is intended to present viable recommendations to assist the combatant commander and his joint task force (JTF) commanders during the planning and execution of CM support operations.<sup>12</sup> Within MACA, MSCA operations are not only time sensitive on account of their impact on human life, infrastructure and public opinion, but also presents a unique challenge to military planners as they can only react to the threat's aftermath. More significantly, the JTF's potential CM tasks required to support federal interagency efforts during disasters are commensurate with those required to support the full spectrum of MACA, including catastrophes caused by terrorism and/or WMD. These tasks include commanding, controlling and employing joint forces, conducting crisis action planning, enhancing interoperability, and fostering cooperation and coordination among JTF units and interagency.<sup>13</sup> Consequently, due to this correlation of tasks, studying MSCA operations provides viable lessons applicable to CM support across the entire MACA operational spectrum.

Given a disaster or catastrophe in the NORTHCOM AOR, would a deployable JTF augmentation cell (DJTFAC) increase effectiveness and efficiency in the JTF staff during planning and execution of consequence management support operations?<sup>14</sup> It is my hypothesis is that a rapidly deployable,

---

<sup>12</sup>A joint task force (JTF) is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subordinate unified command commander, or an existing joint task force commander. A JTF may be established on a geographical area or functional basis when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics. *Joint Doctrine Capstone and Primer, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)* (Washington, D.C., 2001), 19.

<sup>13</sup>JTF staff performs key functions and responsibilities critical to facilitating the JTF commander's accomplishment of the mission. Section B, *Key Functions and Responsibilities*, JP 5-00.2, addresses the JTF commander and staff critical tasks by functional areas (personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, civil-military operations, communications, special, and personal staff) and addresses crisis action planning, employment of trained liaison officers, and fostering cooperation with interagency as critical tasks for the JTF. Joint Pub 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures* (Washington, D.C., 1999), II-6 thru II-10; Joint Pub 3-08vI, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, Volume I, (Washington, D.C., 1996), passim, and Joint Pub 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C., 2001), 84, 112, 225 & 221.

<sup>14</sup>A Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) is a "combatant commander asset composed of personnel from the CINC's staff and component representatives. The members represent a multi-service, multi-disciplined group of planners and operators, which operationally report to the command's Operations Directorate until deployed to a joint task force (JTF). It can be tailored to meet the needs of a commander, joint task force,

trained, and educated, joint staff augmentation cell will increase effectiveness and efficiency in the JTF staff by enhancing flexibility, interoperability, and unity of effort during the conduct of consequence management support operations in NORTHCOM's AOR. Upon activation, NORTHCOM gained Joint Force Headquarters Homeland Security (JFHQ-HLS) from Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). JFHQ-HLS has two standing JTFs: JTF 6, which provides DOD counter-drug support to federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, and JTF Civil-Support, which is charged with conducting WMD consequence management in support of civil authorities.<sup>15</sup> In support of these standing JTFs, or any other future JTFs designated by the combatant commander, the monograph examines the employment of a DJTFAC as an agent of action to enhance the JTF commander's ability to plan and execute CM support operations in NORTHCOM.

Focusing on command and control (C2) and joint staff operations procedures, the monograph examines the mission, organization, and scope of operations of two historical joint task forces: JTF Andrew during relief operations in August 1992 in support of Hurricane Andrew, which did not employ a DJTFAC, and JTF Aguila (Eagle) during relief operations in October 1998 in support of Hurricane Mitch, which employed a DJTFAC. To assess the usefulness of the DJTFAC, the monograph compares and contrasts these operations using flexibility, interoperability and unity of effort as the evaluation criteria. For the purpose of this monograph, using broad definitions from joint publications as the foundation, the criteria are defined as follows:

Flexibility (JP 3-0): enhancing the JTF commander's freedom of action by providing additional manpower resources (trained and educated joint planners and functional experts) to facilitate crisis

---

and deploy within 48 hours from notification." Members can also act as liaison officers between the combatant commander and the JTF. Joint Pub 1-02, 127.

<sup>15</sup>Joint Force Headquarters Homeland Security (JFHQ-HLS) is the homeland security component of U.S. NORTHCOM that coordinates the land and maritime defense of the continental United States, and military assistance to civil authorities. Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6), headquartered at Biggs Army Airfield, Fort Bliss TX, is the JFHQ-HLS component that provides Department of Defense counter-drug support to federal, regional, state, and local law enforcement. Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) reports directly to JTF-HLS on all matters pertaining to military support to civil authorities responding to a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) event. DOD, "U.S. Northcom Command Setup Becomes Clearer." *DefenseLink News*, 14 August 2002 (on-line); available from [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2002/n08142002\\_200208147.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2002/n08142002_200208147.html); internet; accessed 19 September 2002.

action planning and/or conduct effective liaison with JTF's components and interagency.<sup>16</sup> Discernible and verifiable measures of effectiveness are: (1) Was the JTF staff properly organized, trained, and educated to conduct joint planning? What was the impact? (2) Did the JTF staff produce timely and doctrinally correct orders and instructions to support the operation? What was the impact? (3) Were trained liaison officers (LNO) employed with federal agencies, JTF components and/or other interagency? What was the impact?

Interoperability (JP 1-02): knowledge of employment of joint capabilities (systems, units or forces) to provide services and accept services from other systems, units or forces and use the services exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together (ability to communicate, coordinate and synchronize diverse and complex DOD and interagency assets to facilitate mission accomplishment).<sup>17</sup> Discernible and verifiable measures of effectiveness are: (1) was the JTF staff knowledgeable of component, services, and interagency capabilities and limitations? What was the impact? (2) Was the JTF staff able to effectively establish and sustain communication systems with JTF components, state and federal agencies? What was the impact?

Unity of effort (JP 3-0): facilitates coordination and cooperation among departments and agencies to attain a common understanding of the overall aim and the concept of its attainment (focuses the organization on critical tasks, while working through the idiosyncrasies of a unified command and the federal emergency system to provide effective support to the JTF commander).<sup>18</sup> Discernible and verifiable measures of effectiveness are: (1) Was the JTF staff able to maintain mission focus and prioritize efforts or were they overwhelmed by the complexities of the operational environment? What

---

<sup>16</sup>DOD, Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C., 2001), V-2.

<sup>17</sup>DOD, Joint Publication 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C., 1994), 225.

<sup>18</sup>Joint Pub 3-0, V-2.

was the impact? (3) Was the JTF staff able to effectively interact, coordinate and cooperate with all major actors? What was the impact?

Chapter Two examines NORTHCOM's operational environment in light of four major interdependent variables: geography/regional dynamics, political realm, social expectations, and legal constraints. Geography/regional dynamics refer to the relationship and integration of NORTHCOM'S Area of Responsibility (AOR) with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regional designations and the Continental United States Army (CONUSA)'s areas of operations.<sup>19</sup> Political realm refers to the Federal Response Plan (FRP) and federal disaster relief response system, including command and coordination structure, and roles and interaction of the major local, state and federal actors.<sup>20</sup> Social expectations refer to the reaction and influence that the public, non-governmental organizations, and the news media will have on the execution of CM operations in the AOR as these operations impact on saving lives, mitigating suffering, and salvaging critical infrastructure. Legal constraints deal with current statutory laws governing (and limiting) the use of the military in support of civil authorities within the United States, primarily the Posse Comitatus Act.<sup>21</sup>

---

<sup>19</sup>FEMA is the lead federal agency (LFA) responsible for responding to, planning for, recovering from, and mitigating against domestic disasters and catastrophes within the United States and its territories. A.G. Smart, "Military Support to Domestic Disaster Relief Doctrine for Operating in the Wake of the Enemy." School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, KS, 14 May 93, 2. The CONUSAs have primary responsibility for the defense of the United States. Additional responsibilities include: planning, preparation, and execution of mobilization including Reserve and National Guard training and validation; assuming operational control (within assigned regions of responsibility) over active component installations designated as power projection and power support platforms during mobilization and supporting lead federal agencies during domestic relief operations. Mike Hamer, FORSCOM Mobilization Briefing, FORSCOM Headquarters, Fort McPherson, Atlanta, GA, 14 December 2002.

<sup>20</sup>The Federal Response Plan (FRP) provides the framework for the systematic, coordinated, and effective delivery of Federal assistance required to deal with the consequences of any major disaster or emergency declared under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), *Federal Response Plan* (on-line); available from <http://www.fema.gov/rrr/frp/frpfig1.shtm>; internet; accessed 15 October 2002.

<sup>21</sup>The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), Title 18 of the U.S. Code (USC), Section 1385, was enacted after the Civil War in response to the perceived misuse of federal troops who were charged with domestic law enforcement in the South. The phrase "posse comitatus" is literally translated from Latin as the "power of the country" and is defined in common law to refer to all those over the age of 15 upon whom a sheriff could call for assistance in preventing any type of civil disorder. *DOPLAW*, 8.

Chapter Three introduces the concept of the Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) as described in Joint Publication 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, and uses the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and the United States Pacific Command (PACOM) DJTFAC models to discuss the mission, organization, equipment, employment criteria, capabilities and limitations of these units. Chapter Four compares and contrasts JTF Andrew (JTF without a DJTFAC) and JTF Aguila (JTF with a DJTFAC)'s consequence management operations in support of MSCA. It looks at how the JTFs were organized to support relief operations, their operational timeline, command and control structure, and scope of operations. The chapter focuses on lessons learned in the areas of flexibility, interoperability and unity of effort. Chapter Five summarizes the analysis conducted throughout the monograph and presents a cohesive argument responding to the monograph question. It concludes by presenting recommendations for the organization of a DJTFAC at NORTHCOM using Dr. Jamshid Gharajedaghi's systems thinking and design analysis model.<sup>22</sup>

As NORTHCOM prepares to perform its mission - responsibility for military operations in the most powerful, advanced, and educated nation in the world - what are the challenges inherent in its operational environment?<sup>23</sup> Chapter Two addresses this question discussing the major factors shaping NORTHCOM's CM operational environment.

---

<sup>22</sup>In his book, *Systems Thinking: Managing Chaos and Complexity: A Platform for Designing Business Architecture*, Dr. Gharajedaghi addresses systems thinking and design processes. His approach is about "a new mode of seeing, doing, and being in the world; a way of thinking through chaos and complexity." He discusses systems philosophy and theories, principles, and methodology. Furthermore, he presents a systematic approach to designing solutions, explaining the idealized design in terms of the system's boundaries and business environment, the purpose, functions, structure, processes, and measurement of systems. Jamshid Gharajedaghi, *Systems Thinking: Managing Chaos and Complexity: A Platform for Designing Business Architecture* (Butterworth-Heinemann: Woburn, MA, 2002); passim.

<sup>23</sup>The U.S. has the largest and most technologically powerful economy in the world, with a per capita GDP of \$36,300. In terms of literacy, age 15 and over can read and write - male: 97%; female: 97% (1979 est.); total population: 97%. Annual college enrollment: @ 14.5 million. Government Guide, *CIA, The World Fact Book 2002* (on-line), and *National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics, 2001* (on-line); available from <http://nces.ed.gov/pubs/2002/digest2001/ch1.asp>; internet, and [http://www.governmentguide.com/govsite.adp?bread=\\*Main&url=http%3A//www.governmentguide](http://www.governmentguide.com/govsite.adp?bread=*Main&url=http%3A//www.governmentguide); internet; accessed 3 December 2002.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **The Consequence Management Operational Environment**

Terrain is everywhere.

Anonymous<sup>24</sup>

To gain a better appreciation of the scope of NORTHCOM's consequence management (CM) support operations, first, we must keep in mind that the command will operate within the United States - an open, democratic, multidimensional, and modular society - a nation that has been shaped by unique cultural, economic, political and legal circumstances. Consequently, by definition, the combatant commander will operate in a complex environment.<sup>25</sup> Second, the fact that operations will be conducted on U.S. soil, territories, and neighboring countries presents unique challenges for the military. These challenges can be ascertained considering the domestic CM operational environment in an integrated and holistic manner. This operational environment is the product of a conglomerate of interactions that can be best explained in terms of the relationship among four major areas: geography, politics, social expectations and legal constraints; these interdependent variables define NORTHCOM's operational environment.

### **Geographical and Regional Dynamics**

#### **The Area of Responsibility (AOR)**

NORTHCOM's AOR includes the land masses and aerospace of Continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, portions of the Caribbean Basin, and the contiguous waters in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans out to approximately 500 NM. As shown in figure 1 (The World with Commanders' Areas of

---

<sup>24</sup>Quote by unnamed U.S. Army senior officer (under the non-attribution policy) on 20 September 2002 during remarks at the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

<sup>25</sup>Mitchell Waldrop, *Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos* (Touchstone: New York, 1995), 11.

Responsibility), geographically, the AOR is not the largest among the regional commands; nevertheless, it is still a sizable area presenting unique challenges to the combatant commander.<sup>26</sup> For the first time, he is responsible for coordinating a myriad of military support operations within the Continental United States and neighboring countries. When we take into account the vast territory, massive population, and highly developed and sophisticated infrastructure it is easy to see that responsibility for this AOR is a challenging task. The more advanced and sophisticated the nation, the greater concentration of resources, infrastructure and people are potentially vulnerable to major natural disasters; more significantly, as we experienced during September 11, vulnerable to destruction and devastation if targeted by terrorist attacks involving WMD.<sup>27</sup>

Local and state governments have statutory geographical responsibilities that will add to the intricacy of conducting military operations within the United States. The AOR complexity increases as we consider potential operations involving Alaska and neighboring countries within the AOR as international cross-border operations required detailed and delicate agreements among governments. Understanding the criticality of international, interagency, and interstate cooperation becomes vital for military planners. Friction will occur as lines of operation and responsibility are crossed among federal and states agencies. NORTHCOM could find itself in the middle - as the command responsible for military operations across the entire AOR - of territorial and jurisdiction political disputes. To further

---

<sup>26</sup>Terms of reference for NORTHCOM – U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) retains responsibility for contingency planning, operations, security cooperation, and force protection for Cuba, the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, the Turks and the Caicos. Thomas La Crosse, "Directorate of Military Support (DOMS): Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA)." PowerPoint presentation, (CGSC, Ft Leavenworth, KS., 15 Sep 02), 39. Additionally, in the United States, in reference to Federal assistance during relief operations, a "state" means any state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. FEMA, *Federal Response Plan*, for Public Law 93-288, as amended (Washington, DC, 1992); passim.

<sup>27</sup>U.S. population: 280,562,489 (July 2002 est.). Geography - World's third-largest country by size (after Russia and Canada) and by population (after China and India). Area: total: 9,629,091 sq km; (land: 9,158,960 sq km; water: 470,131 sq km --note: includes only the 50 states and District of Columbia). Area – comparative: about half the size of Russia; about three-tenths the size of Africa; about half the size of South America (or slightly larger than Brazil); slightly larger than China; about two and a half times the size of Western Europe. Land boundaries: total: 12,034 km (border countries: Canada 8,893 km (including 2,477 km with Alaska), Mexico 3,141 km. Coastline: 19,924 km. *CIA, The World Fact Book 2002 (on-line)*; available from <http://www.governmentguide.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html>; internet; accessed 3 December 2002.



illustrate this point, among the major Federal organizations with territorial and regional responsibility during emergencies within the United States, we will discuss two, FEMA and the CONUSA.




Figure 1: The World with Commander's Areas of Responsibility (source US Northcom Home Page at <http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.whoware&section=10>, accessed 7 Nov 02).

### The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

As a bedrock document, *The Disaster Relief Act of 1974* recognizes that state and local authorities are ultimately responsible for providing assistance to their citizens during natural disasters. However, it empowers the President to use Federal assets to support state or local agencies when the extent of the damages exceeds their capabilities.<sup>28</sup> The Act establishes the basis for the organization of FEMA -

<sup>28</sup>Local and state governments are dominant under most circumstances as they are vested with the primary responsibility for protecting life and property within their communities. This particularly applies in case of disasters, where the governors of the affected states must first request federal assistance before a presidential declaration is issued and FEMA is empowered to act. Once FEMA arrives, it is in charge of planning and coordinating the federal response. This relief effort, however, is closely coordinated with state and local officials to ensure statutory responsibilities are met. Rare occasions when the federal government is permitted, by stature, to act with authority over local and state jurisdiction are governed by the "Emergency Authority" of the U.S. These actions, when taken, are intended to preserve public order and carry out governmental operations within U.S. territorial limits, or otherwise in accordance with applicable law. This "Emergency Authority" is reserved for

another major federal organization with geographical and regional responsibilities - and directs the development of an Integrated Emergency Management System with all-hazards approach that includes "direction, control and warning systems, which are common to the full range of emergencies from small isolated events to the ultimate emergency - war."<sup>29</sup> FEMA is the lead organization responsible for responding to domestic disasters and catastrophes within the United States and its territories, and it is designated Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for Consequence Management (CM).<sup>30</sup> As shown in figure 2, FEMA is organized into ten regional offices. Each region covers several states and territories where regional staff coordinates and works directly with the state and local representatives to help plan for disasters and meet requirements when major disasters occur.<sup>31</sup> This becomes important for the NORTHCOM staff and units, as they must become familiar with the specific operating procedures and idiosyncrasies associated with each FEMA region, states and local governments, and interagency bureaucracy.

---

extremely unusual circumstances pursuant to preventing loss of life or wanton destruction of property, or to restore governmental functions and public order (e.g. during civil disturbances), and only if duly constituted local authorities are unable to handle the situation. Moreover, because the Federal government has a Constitutional obligation to protect every state in the Union from domestic violence, Congress has enacted the Insurrection Act, which allows the President (upon request of a state legislature or of its governor if the legislature cannot be convened) to use federal forces to assist state governments, enforce Federal authority, and protect Constitutional rights during emergencies. Title 10, *U.S. Code*, section 331, U.S. Public Law 93-288, *The Disaster Relief Act of 1974* (Washington, D.C., 1974), 164, and *DOPLAW*, 20-21, 51-54.

<sup>29</sup>President Carter's 1979 executive order merged many of the separate disaster-related responsibilities into a new Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Among other agencies, FEMA absorbed: the Federal Insurance Administration, the National Fire Prevention and Control Administration, the National Weather Service Community Preparedness Program, the Federal Preparedness Agency of the General Services Administration and the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration activities from HUD. Civil defense responsibilities were also transferred to the new agency from DOD's Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. *DOPLAW*, 82.

<sup>30</sup>A.G. Smart, "Military Support to Domestic Disaster Relief Doctrine for Operating in the Wake of the Enemy." School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, KS, 14 May 93, 2.

<sup>31</sup>*FEMA* Homepage (on-line); available from <http://www.fema.gov/about/history.shtm>; internet; accessed 5 October 2002.

Key to success is understanding, mitigating, and reducing the professional friction that occurs when one organization views another as trying to “invade” their territory.




Figure 2: FEMA Regional Responsibilities (map from <http://www.fema.gov>; accessed 5 October 2002)

Understanding the criticality of interstate and interagency cooperation and networking becomes vital for the military planners; therefore, NORTHCOM must be politically sensitive about perceptions and actual regional designations and jurisdiction responsibilities. This can be achieved by learning how the current system works and fostering a sense of cooperation among all major actors. Friction will impede cooperation if lines of operation and responsibility are not properly coordinated among federal, state, and local agencies.

### The Continental United States Army (CONUSA)

Similar to FEMA, DOD's United States Army has major commands operating within the Continental United States with specific geographical responsibilities, which play an important role during CM operations, that are now impacted by NORTHCOM's AOR. Another major organization with geographical responsibility is the CONUSA. Currently there are two CONUSAs: First and Fifth Army. The CONUSAs, assigned to Forces Command (FORSCOM), are the Army's major commands with primary responsibility for the defense of the United States and training and validation of National

Guard and Reserve units during mobilization. First Army is responsible for all states east of the Mississippi River, including Minnesota, while the Fifth Army is FORSCOM's planning agent and DOD executive agent for 21 states in the western United States. Both CONUSAs are charged with planning and assisting lead federal agencies (LFA) during disaster relief operations. They provide policy, guidance, and direction to the Defense Coordinating Officers (DCO) prior to and during disaster response.<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, in the event of an incident involving WMD, both CONUSAs are tasked with providing a regional task force (RTF East/West) to facilitate support to the LFA.<sup>33</sup> In executing this mission, the CONUSAs maintain close and continuous coordination with the state Offices of Emergency Services (OES), State Adjutant Generals (TAGs), and the FEMA regional offices within their assigned states.<sup>34</sup> What is the potential issue? The CONUSAs have been providing support within their designated states of responsibility, and now, DOD has changed the paradigm by establishing a unified headquarters responsible for orchestrating all military operations within those states. As we look at the geographical dynamics impacting this command - AOR designation, FEMA's regional orientation, and CONUSAs' habitual relationship with assigned states - it becomes apparent that there is potential for friction among local, state and federal actors as jurisdiction issues arise across the AOR.

---

<sup>32</sup>The DCO is a military or civilian officer designated by the Executive Agent or responsible DOD component to coordinate MSCA activities with FEMA. See section on Military Support in this Chapter.

<sup>33</sup>DOD established Response Task Force (RTF) Headquarters (HQ) within the military components to support the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) under the Federal Response Plan (FRP). Two HQ were established within the Army within the CONUSA. RTF-East (First Army) supports FEMA regions I-V (27 states) and the District of Columbia. RTF-West (Fifth Army) supports FEMA regions VI-X (21 states). Each RTF contains a Rapid Assessment Element (RAE) and a reconnaissance and decontamination element. *DOPLAW*, 136.

<sup>34</sup>On January 1, 1966, First and Second Armies merged and First Army headquarters moved to Fort Meade, MD. In 1973, First Army transitioned from an Active Army oriented organization to one dedicated to improving the readiness of Reserve Components. Once again, in 1983, another reorganization took place. Second U.S. Army was reactivated at Fort Gillem, GA, and assumed responsibility for Reserve Component matters in seven states and two territories formerly belonging to First Army. In 1991, Fourth U.S. Army was deactivated and its seven Midwestern states became part of First Army. In 1995, First Army left Fort Meade, MD and was reorganized at Fort Gillem, GA. Fifth Army is the FORSCOM planning agent and DOD executive agent for 21 states in the western United States, charged with responsibility to plan for and respond to disaster relief. This AOR encompasses more than two million square miles and a population of approximately 100 million. In 1997, Fifth Army assumed the mission of response to Weapons of Mass Destruction incidents for its area of responsibility. *Fifth Army Homepage* (on-line); available from <http://www.5tharmy.army.mil/FifthArmy/about/5thaguide.htm#SEC5>; internet, and *First Army Homepage* (on-line); available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/1army.htm>; internet; accessed 7 October 2002.

## Political Realm

### The Federal Response Plan

Federal activities and programs are highly regulated and injected with political overtones. It is important for NORTHCOM to understand the genesis of the federal response system and the political susceptibilities that precedes and follows a domestic intervention; only then can the command be in a position to provide adequate support. Once the President declares an incident as a major disaster, the Federal Response Plan (FRP) provides the political and functional framework for the systematic, coordinated, and effective Federal response during major disasters or emergencies.<sup>35</sup>

The FRP provides guidelines, policies, planning assumptions, concept of operation, and concept of support for response and recovery actions. The FRP provides focus for interagency and intergovernmental emergency preparedness and response. It serves as the foundation for the development of supplemental plans and procedures needed to orchestrate response and recovery activities rapidly and efficiently.<sup>36</sup> NORTHCOM will support a major federal plan that employs a multi-agency operational structure that uses the principles of the Incident Command System (ICS) based on a model adopted by the fire and rescue community.<sup>37</sup> Critical to the success of supporting CM operations is understanding the overarching ICS principles including the use of common terminology, modular organization, integrated communications, unified command structure, action planning, manageable span-of-control, pre-designated facilities system, and resource management procedures. As depicted in figure 3, as NORTHCOM becomes familiar with the national disaster operational network, it must

---

<sup>35</sup>Under the Stafford Act and Executive Orders 12148, Federal Emergency Management, and 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, FEMA has been delegated primary responsibility for coordinating Federal emergency preparedness, planning, management, and disaster assistance functions. FEMA also has been delegated responsibility for establishing Federal disaster assistance policy. In this stewardship role, FEMA has the lead in developing and maintaining the FRP. FEMA, *Federal Response Plan (FRP)* (Washington, D.C., 1992); available on-line from <http://www.fema.gov/r-n/frp/>; internet; accessed 6 October 2002.

<sup>36</sup>*Federal Response Plan* (on-line); available from <http://www.fema.gov/rrr/frp/frpfig1.shtm>; internet; accessed 15 Oct 02.

<sup>37</sup>FEMA, *Federal Response Plan: Concept of Operations from the Basic Plan* (Washington, D.C., 1999), 15.

consider not only the relationship and interaction of federal, state, and local government, but also the role and sphere of influence of private, voluntary, and international actors on the overall planning and conduct of CM operations.




Figure 3: National Disaster Response Network (<http://www.fema.adp/fema.gov/>, accessed 15Oct 02). Chart constructed by author).

Understanding interagency dynamics is the first step in providing effective military support to civil authorities. In its interagency role, FEMA executes a wide range of tasks including notification, activation, mobilization, deployment, staffing and facility setup, processing the Governor's request for disaster assistance, coordinating Federal operations under a disaster declaration, and appointing a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) for each declared State. During extended operations, FEMA provides support for logistics management, communications and information technology, financial management, community relations, congressional affairs, public information, and information collection, analysis, and dissemination.<sup>38</sup>

### Emergency Support Functions

To synchronize operations and enhance command and control, based on the type of emergency, the Federal Response Plan (FRP) designates Lead Federal Agencies (LFA) to coordinate the different types

---

<sup>38</sup> *Federal Response Plan*; <http://www.fema.gov/rrr/frp/frpconc.shtm#dco>; accessed 15 Oct 02.

of Federal response.<sup>39</sup> As shown in figure 4, the Federal Response Plan (FRP) establishes twelve functional areas pertaining to disaster response. The basic premise is that functionality is linked to specific capabilities inherent to departments and organizations established in the national network based on subject-matter expertise, organizational structure, manning and equipment. Federal departments and agencies are assigned primary and secondary ESF responsibility and are expected to support each other in the execution of these missions. The ESF describes the mission, policies, concept of operations, and responsibilities of the primary and support agencies involved in the implementation of the emergency response functions in support of state and local activities.<sup>40</sup> Although DOD has primary responsibility for only Public Works (ESF #3), it is designated supporting agency for the remaining eleven ESFs.<sup>41</sup> To fulfill this role, NORTHCOM must become knowledgeable and proficient on all support requirements necessary to facilitate operations across the full ESF spectrum; coordination and cooperation are essential to mission success. This requires NORTHCOM to establish a deliberate program to conduct joint and interagency training exercises focused on developing ESF functional experts and professional liaison officers within the headquarters to better prepare the command to interact with and support the other LFAs.<sup>42</sup>

---

<sup>39</sup>Under the Stafford Act, FEMA serves as the primary coordinating agency for disaster response and recovery activities, and LFA responsible for CM within the US. The FRP also may be implemented in response to the consequences of terrorism, IAW PDD-39 and PDD-62 that set forth U.S. counterterrorism policy. The FRP Terrorism Incident Annex describes the concept of operations for a unified response to a terrorism incident involving two or more of the following plans: the FRP, the FBI's WMD Incident Contingency Plan, the Department of Health, and Human Services (HHS) Health and Medical Services Support Plan for the Federal Response to Acts of Chemical/Biological Terrorism. *DOPLAW*, 123-124.

<sup>40</sup>Each ESF is headed by a primary agency designated on the basis of its authorities, resources, and capabilities in the particular functional area. Other agencies have been designated as support agencies for one or more ESFs based on their resources and capabilities to support the functional area(s). FEMA: *Federal Response Plan - Emergency Support Function Annexes*; available from <http://www.fema.gov/trr/frp/>; accessed 6 Oct 02.

<sup>41</sup>*DOPLAW*, 94.

<sup>42</sup>With the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and the reorganization of several Federal agencies under it, it is unclear if, or how, the FRP will be changed, or amended, to reflect emerging roles and responsibilities of the newly-created Department. Moreover, it is unclear if, or how, the scope of the ESF (functional areas and LFA responsibilities) will be changed, or modified, now that NORTHCOM has been established. Whatever the outcome, NORTHCOM must be prepared to accomplish its mission. An area that doubly will change, due to its legal implications, is that DOD will remain in a supporting role of a LFA during domestic operations. *DOPLAW*, 2-3.

<b>Emergency Support Function</b>	<b>Functional Area</b>	<b>Lead Federal Agency (LFA)</b>
ESF 1	Transportation	Department of Transportation (DOT)
ESF 2	Communications	Office of Science and Technology Policy
<b>ESF 3</b>	<b>Public Works and Engineering</b>	<b>DOD/Corps of Engineers</b>
ESF 4	Firefighting	Department of Agriculture/Forest Service
ESF 5	Information and Planning	FEMA
ESF 6	Mass Care	American Red Cross
ESF 7	Resource Support	General Service Administration
ESF 8	Health and Medical Care Services	U.S. Public Health Service
ESF 9	Urban Search and Rescue	FEMA
ESF 10	Hazardous Materials	Environmental Protection Agency
ESF 11	Food	Department of Agriculture
ESF 12	Energy	Department of Energy

Figure 4: Federal Response Plan Emergency Support Functions (Table created by author)

## Military Support

As policy, DOD will normally provide support only when other resources are unavailable and only if providing support does not interfere with its primary mission or ability to respond to operational contingencies.<sup>43</sup> All national-level requests for military support are made through the Director of Military Support (DOMS), who represents the DOD executive agent. To facilitate this mission, DOMS exercises national-level oversight of the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) function.<sup>44</sup> The DCO is a military or civilian officer designated by the Executive Agent or responsible DOD component to coordinate MACA activities. He is the DOD “on -scene” representative and is responsible for

---

<sup>43</sup> *DOPLAW*, 94-95.

<sup>44</sup> Per appointment by SecDef, SecArmy is the DOD Executive Agent (EA) for MSCA. On 2 Oct 01, SecDef named SecArmy as interim EA for HLS. SecArmy has the authority to task Unified Combatant Commanders, services, and defense agencies to provide MSCA and HLS support for Presidentially declared disasters, emergencies, and/or terrorist events. DOMS coordinates the provision of military support by the Army and activates and controls a joint staff to conduct operations during declared disasters, emergencies, and/or terrorist events. Global Security Organization, *DOMS* (on-line); available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/doms.htm>; internet; accessed 23 December 2002.



coordinating support requirements with the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). Typically, the DCO, an officer in grade O-6 or above, has come from one of the two CONUSAs. The DCO plays a critical role by validating requirements for military support determining if the military could and should support the request; forwarding mission assignments to the appropriate military organizations; and assigning military liaison officers to provide technical assistance to applicable activated ESFs. The DCO, through appropriate military channels, refers problematic and contentious military support issues to DOMS, which in turn facilitates resolution at the national level.<sup>45</sup>

### **Social Expectations**

Another major variable impacting on the operational environment is the sociology of the disasters and the impact on U.S. citizens and their communities. As the events of 11 September showed, when a disaster or a catastrophe occurs in our frontyard, the nation's psychological and social expectations sharpen. Sociologist Claude Gilbert, in his article "Studying Disaster: A Review of the Main Conceptual Tools," describes disasters as involving social definitions of physical harm and disruption of routine activities in societies or their larger subsystems. He observes social expectations and human reactions during a major disaster or catastrophes can be classified into three main paradigms. First, disaster could be view as a "duplication of war (catastrophe can be attributed to an external agent; human communities are entities that react globally against an aggression)". Second disasters as an "expression of social vulnerabilities (disaster is the result of underlying community logic, of an inward and social process). Third, disasters as an "entrance into a state of uncertainty (disaster is tightly

---

<sup>45</sup>The DCO is intended to be the single point of contact in the field with responsibility to coordinate and validate the use of DOD resources. He coordinates RFAs and mission assignments with the FCO or designated representative and interfaces with local and state officials during the conduct of relief operations. He is typically supported by a Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) composed of administrative staff and liaison personnel. Typically, the DCE staff comes from the same headquarters as the DCO and is, for the most part, service-oriented and not too familiar, or knowledgeable, in the conduct of joint operations. *DOPLAW*, 61, 96-98.

anchored into the impossibility of defining real or supposed dangers, especially after the upsetting of the mental frameworks we use to know and understand reality").<sup>46</sup>

During disasters and catastrophes the affected people and communities may display one or more symptoms associated with psychological shock (aggression, hopelessness, uncertainty, etc.) as described in Gilbert's categories. This phenomena, coupled with the physical reality of injury, sickness, death, and potential destruction of critical infrastructure and resources, adds complexity to the operational environment.<sup>47</sup> Consequently, NORTHCOM needs to prepare its personnel to deal with the physical and emotional manifestations (physical injuries, psychological shock; helplessness; anger/rage, displaced civilian/lack of shelter, hunger, lack of water, vandalism, crime) they will likely encounter while conducting CM support operations.<sup>48</sup>

Once a major disaster has been declared, social expectations are that the Federal government will act expeditiously to assist the affected communities. Although in a supporting role, NORTHCOM could experience political pressure, directly or indirectly, by state and local officials, politicians, and special interest groups (non-governmental organizations and other private organizations), concerning how the command should operate and what priorities it should establish.<sup>49</sup> One of most powerful actors is the

---

<sup>46</sup>Claude Gilbert, "Studying Disaster: A Review of the Main Conceptual Tools," *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*, Volume 13, No. 3 (November 1995), 231-240; available from <http://www.usc.edu/schools/sppd/ijmed/v13n3.html>; internet; accessed 19 December 2002.

<sup>47</sup>The concept of disaster in the modern world has been socially constructed from traditional notions relating to catastrophic events. Disasters in modern societies contain strong elements of a release of repressed existential anxiety, triggered by a perceived betrayal of trust by contemporary institutions. It is speculated that the well-known "disaster myths" that figure in media and other accounts of disastrous events are elements of a related characterization of disasters as a loss of control of social order. Tom Horlick-Jones, "Modern Disasters as Outrage and Betrayal," *Ibid*, Volume 13, No. 3 (November 1995), 305-315.

<sup>48</sup>The International Sociological Association, a research committee on sociology of disasters RC39 (established in 1986), which objective is to provide a forum where academics and practitioners can share information about all aspects of disasters, conducted studies that found psychological distress is common after disasters. These studies have relied mainly on cross-sectional data, sometimes using case matching and respondent recall to infer causality. It was found that levels of social support and the sense of purpose to one's life did decrease on average after disasters (e.g. hurricanes), although, in some cases, the sense of control did not. Marieke Van Willigen, "Do Disasters Affect Individuals' Psychological Well-Being? An Over-Time Analysis of the Effect of Hurricane Floyd on Men and Women in Eastern North Carolina," *Ibid*, Volume 19, No. 1, (March 2001), 59-83.

<sup>49</sup>Thomas A. Birkland, in his article, "Natural Disasters as Focusing Events: Policy Communities and Political Response," explains the policy implications of disasters and addresses how large hurricanes and

news media, which plays a major role on providing national and international visibility to the command's operations.<sup>50</sup> NORTHCOM needs a strong, trained, and educated staff to work closely with the news media in the interagency environment to take full advantage of their capabilities. The command must be ready to execute its mission, as undoubtedly, the American public, news media, politicians, and other critics, will critically scrutinize these operations, as they will impact directly on saving lives, mitigating suffering, and salvaging critical infrastructure. NORTHCOM must prepare its staff and units, particularly its JTFs, to deal with the tremendous social pressures of the operational environment. This involves focused training and education on civil-military operations and media-related skills. Moreover, NORTHCOM must ensure that its units work in harmony and cooperation with the public, governmental officials and private organizations; this requires knowledge of interagency operations and delicate coordination and cooperation among all major actors.<sup>51</sup>

---

earthquakes influence Congressional agenda activity. He contends that by understanding these events as focusing events, we can better appreciate how they influence the news media, the public, and Congress to be more attentive to these incidents. Different types of disaster turn on the political environment in which federal policy to address these disasters is made, and include the nature of the committees charged with policy-making, the nature of testimony offered before the committees, and the nature of the professional communities that are most active in this policy-making. Thomas A. Birkland, "Natural Disasters as Focusing Events: Policy Communities and Political Response," *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*, Volume 19, No. 1, (March 2001), 221-243.

<sup>50</sup>Media reports constitute a major source of information upon which people base their responses. Variables such as prior experience, the responses of others, selectivity in attention, and various characteristics of the content of media reports interact to influence responses. In the absence of personal experience, people are more likely to respond to media reports regardless of personal relevance or seriousness of the consequences of the hazard events reported. Furthermore, people may use media reports of others' behaviors as cues to appropriate responses. Ruth J. Seydlitz, William Spencer, Shirley Laska, and Elizabeth Triche. "The Effects of Newspaper Reports on the Public's Response to a Natural Hazard Event," *Ibid*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 1991), 5-29. Furthermore, South Florida residents who experienced Hurricane Andrew evaluated the credibility of the hurricane-related information from television as more trustworthy than that from other sources. The findings indicated that when people wanted factual information and self-help information, they expressed reservations about the credibility of other people (friends, neighbors, or relatives), but there was a marked tendency to place emphasis (or faith) in television. Paul Driscoll and Michael B. Salwen, "Riding Out the Storm: Public Evaluations of News Coverage of Hurricane Andrew," *Ibid.*, 293-303.

<sup>51</sup>In the intervening years since Hurricane Andrew in August 1992, there have been several studies by federal agencies and the Academy of Public Administration on intergovernmental cooperation during disasters and how to effect cooperation in multi-centered states with multiple counties (with multiple municipalities). The problem is not for the threat of hurricanes alone, it is for the many potential disasters, natural and man-made, which may be addressed with incident command systems at the local level, but may also need mechanisms to coordinate county, regional, state, or national responses. Based on these studies, officials are recognizing that intergovernmental cooperation is imperative during relief operations. Delores N. Kory, "Coordinating Intergovernmental Policies on Emergency Management in a Multi-Centered Metropolis," *Ibid.*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (March 1998), 45-54.

## ***Legal Considerations***

NORTHCOM operations in support of civil authorities must comply strictly with statutory guidelines on the employment of military forces in CONUS such as those prescribed in the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act (PCA). The act prohibits direct military involvement in law enforcement operations such as interdicting vehicles, vessels, and aircraft; conducting surveillance, searches, pursuit and seizures; or making arrests on behalf of civilian law enforcement authorities.<sup>52</sup> NORTHCOM's operations will be permeated by legal issues pertaining to Rules of Engagement (ROE), Rules for the Use of Force (RUF), custody and detection, search and seizure, use of riot control agents, and confinement facilities that will have to be defined and resolved during the conduct of operations.

Furthermore, the PCA establishes additional restrictions for military participation in civilian law enforcement activities. These restrictions fall under three major categories: use of information collected during military operations (collecting and disseminating information that affect U.S. persons and organizations not affiliated with DOD is prohibited); use of military equipment and facilities (the loan or lease of certain military equipment and providing expert advice and training is regulated by statute), and the use of military personnel (direct assistance and participation by military personnel in the execution of law enforcement activities such as interdiction of vehicles, vessel, aircraft, or other similar activity; conduct of search and seizure operations, executing an arrest, apprehension, stop and frisk, or similar activities; or the use of military personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as

---

<sup>52</sup>The Act states: "Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." DoD Directive 5525.5 extended the PCA to the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps. The PCA does not apply to the U.S. Coast Guard. It has come to symbolize the separation of civilian affairs from military influence. The PCA generally prohibits U.S. military personnel from interdicting vehicles, vessels and aircraft; conducting surveillance, searches, pursuit and seizures; or making arrests on behalf of civilian law enforcement authorities. Prohibiting direct military involvement in law enforcement is in keeping with long-standing U.S. law and policy limiting the military's role in domestic affairs. However, Congress has enacted a number of exceptions to the PCA that allow the military, in certain situations, to assist civilian law enforcement agencies in enforcing the laws of the United States. The PCA doesn't apply to the National Guard while under state control; once federalized, the PCA applies. *DOPLAW 8*, and *U.S. Northcom Home Page*; accessed 7 November 2002.

undercover agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators is prohibited).<sup>53</sup> Furthermore, issues dealing with billeting of troops, claims, medical support, civil law, ordinances, restrictions and interference with federal forces, environmental law, international cross-border operations with Canada and Mexico are other areas needing definition and resolution.<sup>54</sup>

In summary thus far, under provisions of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, upon a presidential declaration of disaster or emergency, FEMA becomes the lead federal agency (LFA) for CM and DOD responds under the guidelines of the FRP; as a unified command, NORHTCOM is now responsible for leading the DOD support effort.<sup>55</sup> As depicted in figure 5, the operational environment is complex - geographically, socially, politically, and legally sensitive- accordingly, when a disaster occurs, NORTHCOM must know how the Federal response machinery works, who are the major actors, and how to best support the LFAs. Understanding these dynamics, and the necessity to maintain flexibility, while improving interoperability and unity of effort, is paramount to reduce the friction inherent to synchronizing operations across the full spectrum of MACA in the AOR.

---

<sup>53</sup>Under "exigent circumstances" Federal forces assisting law enforcement may make a search without a warrant when they believe (probable cause) that weapons, objects related to criminal activity, or persons believed to have committed an offense, are in the place to be searched; and they believe that the delay in obtaining a warrant would result in removal or destruction of the weapons or objects related to criminal activity. The federal courts have enunciated three test which are generally used to determine whether the use of military personnel violates the PCA. If any of three is met, the assistance may be considered a violation of the PCA: (1) whether the actions of the military personnel were "active" or "passive" -only direct, active use of military personnel to enforce the laws is a violation of the PCA; (2) whether the use of military personnel pervaded activities of civilian law enforcement officials- to be a violation, under this criterion, military personnel must fully subsume the role of civilian law enforcement officials; and (3) whether the military personnel subjected citizens to the exercise of military power that was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature - a power "proscriptive in nature" is one that prohibits or condemns; a power "compulsory in nature" is one that exerts some coercive force. *DOPLAW*, 17-18, 75.

<sup>54</sup>*Ibid.*, 74-80.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.*, 96-98.




Figure 5: The MACA Operational Environment (source *DOPLAW*; chart constructed by author).

Reducing friction, improving cooperation and interoperability, and having a solid understanding of joint and interagency operations are critical to accomplishing the mission during the conduct of CM support operations.<sup>56</sup> What can the combatant commander do to set favorable conditions and further assist his JTF commanders? An option, as Chapter Three discusses, is the employment of a rapidly deployable, joint-trained and educated, staff augmentation cell to facilitate JTF operations.

<sup>56</sup>DOD, Joint Pub 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures* (Washington, D.C., 1999), II-6 thru II-10.

## CHAPTER THREE

### The Augmentation Cell

As the commander of a unified command, NORTHCOM's combatant commander has several options regarding organizing command structures to fulfill his broad continuing missions.<sup>57</sup> Although these options do not limit his ability to task organize his forces as he sees fit, during CM operations, the most likely option will be to utilize a JTF to support civil authorities. Employing a JTF will give him additional flexibility and freedom of action to continue concentrating on the overall theater security cooperation (TSC) strategy, and act as arbiter in the event of disputes and conflicts among the services, organizations supporting the operation, and the federal government machinery.<sup>58</sup>

With its two standing JTFs (JTF Civil Support and JTF 6), NORTHCOM already possesses the ability to influence selected CM support operations in the AOR. JTF CS provides command and control over DOD forces in support of a lead federal agency ensuring DOD assets are prepared to respond to support requests in a time of national crisis following a WMD incident under existing federal law, which provides for specified and limited military involvement in states as well as U.S. territories.<sup>59</sup> NORTHCOM's other standing JTF, JTF-6, provides DOD counterdrug support to federal, regional, state and local law enforcement agencies throughout the continental United States. Military support is

---

<sup>57</sup>The unified commander can adapt a command structure using any of the following six options: (1) Subordinate Unified Command, (2) Joint Task Force, (3) Functional Component, (4) Service Component, (5) Single-Service Force (normally the combatant commander assigns operations requiring a single-Service force to a Service Component), (6) Specific operational forces that, because of mission assigned and the urgency of the situation, must remain immediately responsive to the combatant commander. DOD, *Joint Doctrine Capstone and Primer, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)* (10 September 2001), 18-19.

<sup>58</sup>The TSC plan, formerly known as the Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) translates the combatant commander's vision for his AOR into executable programs and activities.

<sup>59</sup>JTF CS provides command and control over DOD forces in support of a LFA. Its primary mission is to support the U.S. military and civil authorities in a time of crisis following a WMD incident. JTF CS's CM responsibilities are performed under existing federal law, which provides for specified and limited military involvement in states as well as U.S. territories. In general, federal military involvement must be in accordance with U.S. law, at the request of the governor of the state or U.S. territory, or authorized by the president or Congress. The JTF began operations on 1 October 1999. The JTF includes 26 Active Duty, 28 Reserve, 6 National Guard, 7 Civilians/Government and 24 Contractors. *Northcom Homepage*, accessed 1 Nov 02.

designed to assist law enforcement in their mission to detect, deter, disrupt, and dismantle illegal drug trafficking organizations. JTF-6 provides counterdrug support to law enforcement agencies in three categories: operational, training, and intelligence.<sup>60</sup> Undoubtedly, these standing JTFs will enhance the combatant commander's ability to support MACA operations during counterdrug and WMD incidents. However, as discussed in Chapter Two, the complexity of NORTHCOM's operational environment is such that it is feasible to foresee scenarios what may require the combatant commander to support several incidents across the AOR involving the full spectrum of MACA operations. In these instances, as we will show in Chapter Four, the two standing JTFs may have other priority missions or may become over tasked and unable to meet all operational requirements.

To compensate for these hindrances, the combatant commander may decide to stand up additional JTFs. These newly designated JTFs, for the most part, will be ad hoc in nature and assembled in haste. They may not have the training and experience necessary to effectively start operations at the beginning of the crisis, as they will expend time organizing.<sup>61</sup> In support of these JTF commanders, and to lessen the impact caused by inexperience and the hasty nature of these organizations, the combatant commander can organize, train, equip, and employ a Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC). The DJTFAC provides the JTF commander a readily accessible pool of joint planners and operators from the unified headquarters, which can facilitate the planning effort and execution of joint, combined, and interagency operations. Two models which will enable us to better understand these

---

<sup>60</sup>JTF 6's mission is to synchronize and integrate DOD operational, training and intelligence support to domestic law enforcement agency counterdrug efforts in the continental U.S. It's headquartered at Biggs Army Airfield, Fort Bliss, Texas. All military support to counterdrug operations is based on a valid support request from a law enforcement agency. JTF-6 ensures that all counterdrug support missions offer significant and focused training value to the participating military units as counterdrug support missions provide a tremendous opportunity to enhance individual skills and accomplish unit tactical training. In a single counterdrug operation, volunteer units typically train on at least ninety percent of their wartime tasks. JTF-6 funds all mission costs, to include travel, strategic airlift, and other associated mission costs. JTF-6 is also able to pay flying hour costs for active Army units. Since its organization in 1989, JTF-6 has completed over 5,000 missions in support of more than 430 federal, regional, state, and local law enforcement agencies and counterdrug task forces. Ibid.

<sup>61</sup>For inexperienced personnel, attaining staff synergy, integration, and efficient battle rhythm takes time to develop. Author personal observations, throughout 24 years in the U.S. Army, at Combat Training Centers (CTC), division, battalion, post/installation, and unified command-level command and staff assignments.



organizations are the United States Pacific Command (PACOM) and the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)'s DJTFACs.

### ***USPACOM Deployable JTF Augmentation Cell***

The PACOM DJTFAC is designed to provide responsive joint staff expertise in crisis action and joint staff planning and procedures to a designated PACOM JTF commander and his staff. It is not intended to be a separate or forward element of the unified headquarters, or to replace the JTF staff; it deploys in support of the designated JTF as a planning staff augmentation.<sup>62</sup> The stated mission of the PACOM DJTFAC is: "on order, and with the combatant commander's decision to form a JTF, PACOM DJTFAC augments the JTF HQ to provide responsive joint staff expertise in crisis action and joint staff planning to the designated joint task force commander (JFC) and staff."<sup>63</sup> As shown in figure 6, the DJTFAC is composed of members from each of the primary PACOM directorates and is supplemented by PACOM components as required. They represent a multiservice, multidiscipline pool of trained joint staffers, which can be tailored to meet the needs of the JTF commander.<sup>64</sup>

The DJTFAC provides expertise across all the joint warfighting functional areas. In concept, its members arrive at the JTF headquarters having first hand knowledge of the combatant commander's intent and policies for planning and execution of joint operations in the AOR. DJTFAC members are expected to be intimately familiar with the day-to-day operations of the command; as in many cases, while at home station, the members of the DJTFAC are engaged developing the same policies they will

---

<sup>62</sup>DJTFAC members are integrated fully within the Joint Task Force (JTF) staff, reporting to the JFC. The DJTFAC deploys in support of the PACOM designated JTFs. Deployment will normally occurs after the PACOM activation and warning orders have been drafted, and a JTF has been activated. USCINCPACINST 3020.11B, Organization and Administration of USCINCPAC Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) (Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii, 19 September 1997), 1.

<sup>63</sup>This mission translates to facilitating the planning effort, writing, and synchronizing of the various JTF crisis action products (warning orders, courses of action, concepts of operations, commander's estimate, operations orders, synchronization matrices, deployment orders, execution orders, planning and developing branches and sequels. USCINCPAC, *Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)* (Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii, u. d.), 1-2.

<sup>64</sup>*Ibid.*, 1-1.

assist the JTF commander in implementing.<sup>65</sup> Additionally, the DJTFAC employs component planners, which come with a wealth of Service operational knowledge and experience vital for the successful execution of joint operations. This, coupled with their strategic and operational level perspective, provides the JTF commander with an invaluable asset to enhance the crisis action planning process at the operational level.<sup>66</sup>

To assist the Joint Task Force commander, the PACOM DJTFAC develop, resource, execute and assess its training program focusing on providing expertise in crisis action planning. It focuses on providing specialized functional augmentation to the JTF staff during planning, development, writing, and synchronization of the myriad of products required to effectively command and control the JTF units. These products include, among others, warning orders, campaign planning, courses of action development, deployment and execution orders, Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) development, synchronization matrices, and future plans (branches and sequels).<sup>67</sup> The PACOM DJTFAC provides support to a designated JTF under one of three broad mission categories: contingencies - actual operational deployments in support of operations assisting in all phases of Crisis Action Planning (CAP) from situation development through execution; exercises - deployments in support of PACOM two-tier training exercises, normally as part of JTF planning initiatives, and JTF training - provides focused staff training to prepare JTF commanders and staff in CAP procedures. Typically, this mission is fulfilled as a mobile training team deployment.<sup>68</sup>

The PACOM DJTFAC has three stated mission essential tasks: deploy upon direction of the combatant commander, provide the JTF a core of joint service personnel capable of immediate preparation of crisis action products for a wide range of missions (e.g., combat operations, domestic support operations, and military operations other than war, etc.) and all phases of CAP, and remain with

---

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., 1-2.

<sup>66</sup>Thom Gerke (LtCol), *USCINCPAC Deployable JTF Augmentation Cell*. J382, PowerPoint Briefing (1 October 2001), 5.

<sup>67</sup>*PACOM DJTFAC SOP*, 1-2.

the JTF staff until redeployed by PACOM. The DJTFAC brings a wide variety of joint expertise directly into the JTF's Joint Planning Group (JPG).<sup>69</sup>

In addition to bringing joint planning expertise to the table, the DJTFAC deploys with a small command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) package. This equipment includes a suite of laptop computers with comparable software capable of word processing, graphics and message formatting for subsequent transmittal, and STU-III secured telephones.




Figure 6: USPACOM DJTFAC Task Organization (chart constructed by author).

The PACOM DJTFAC is a rapid deployable and tailored augmentation cell that enhances the planning and execution ability of a JTF by providing joint planners and limited C4I augmentation. It

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., 1-2

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., 1-3

represents the combatant commander's commitment of personnel and resources to support operations in his AOR.<sup>70</sup>

### ***USSOUTHCOM Deployable JTF Augmentation Cell***

Similar to PACOM, the SOUTHCOT DJTFAC is also intended to augment a JTF, designated by the combatant commander, by providing the necessary joint experience and expertise to facilitate the conduct of joint operations. As shown in figure 7, the DJTFAC is composed of SOUTHCOT staff and component representatives. Likewise, the DJTFAC members also represent a multiservice, multidiscipline group of planners and operators, which operationally report to the operations directorate (SCJ3) until deployed to a JTF. The team provides trained and equipped personnel capable of providing C4I augmentation, staff expertise in plans and operations, and could also serve as liaison officers (LNO). When augmented, the DJTFAC can transition into a full up JTF Joint Planning Group (JPG). The team can be tailored to meet the needs of a JTF commander and deploy to the JOA within 48 hours of notification.<sup>71</sup> Personnel selected for DJTFAC duties attend joint professional military education (JPME) phase II training, National Defense University's Worldwide Joint Planning courses and the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Time Sensitive Operations Course. Additionally, they attend the FORSCOM's DOD Emergency Preparedness Course.<sup>72</sup>

The stated mission of the DJTFAC is "on order, SOUTHCOT DJTFAC deploys within the USSOUTHCOM AOR to provide joint crisis action planning (CAP) support to develop campaign plans

---

<sup>70</sup>In terms of additional planning tool, the DJTFAC has the capability to coordinate for planning tools such as the Joint Readiness Automated Management System (JRAMS), the Theater Analysis Replanning and Graphical Execution Toolkit (TARGET), FM Editor (FMEDIT), TPFDD Editor (TPEDIT), weather and logistics planners. Moreover, the DJTFAC have access to supporting tools such as the Mapping Analysis Tool for Transportation (MATT), Shared Map Planning (SMP), Course of Action Selection Tool (COAST), Deployable Global Command and Control System (GCCS) and Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS). Thom Gerke, *USCINCPAC Deployable JTF Augmentation Cell*, 4-6.

<sup>71</sup>DOD, U.S. SOUTHCOT Regulation 10-16, *USSOUTHCOM Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell Standing Operating Procedures* (Miami, Florida, 1999), 3.

<sup>72</sup>JPME II is conducted at the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA. The JOPES courses are conducted by the U.S. Transportation Command, and the Emergency Preparedness Course is conducted by FORSCOM.

and orders during contingency operations and joint exercises to facilitate and enhance crisis action planning and operational execution of assigned missions.<sup>73</sup>




Figure 7. USSOUTHCOM DJTFAC Task Organization (source SC Regulation 10-16; chart created by author).

The SOUTHCOM DJTFAC normally provides support to a JTF under one of two broad mission profiles: contingencies - the DJTFAC deploys to provide joint staff augmentation in CAP during actual operations within the SOUTHCOM AOR (the DJTFAC assists in all phases of CAP facilitating the linkage of the CINC and JTF planning efforts), and exercises - the DJTFAC deploys to provide the same type of planning assistance (as in contingency response situations) to support the Joint Exercise Control

<sup>73</sup>Deployment Planning Considerations: Upon standing-up a JTF, SC J-3 coordinates with the JTF commander to determine DJTFAC requirements. When in support of missions other than a JTF, the DJTFAC deploys after consultation with, and approval by, the Chief of Mission or when directed by the commander in support of a Country Team, or interagency (e.g. JIATF East/South and U.S. Coast Guard, District 7). Ibid., 4.

Group (JECG) during SOUTHCOM joint and combined training exercises.<sup>74</sup> The assistance provided by the DJTFAC can expand across the range of military operations, including providing direct communication and facilitating coordination between the combatant commander, a Chief of Mission or JTF commander during non-combat operations in disaster relief and nation assistance. Additionally, when properly augmented, the DJTFAC can conduct on-site evaluations, make recommendations regarding support requirements for a particular operation, and provide subject matter experts (SMEs) to the Chief of Mission and/or U.S. Embassy's Emergency Action Committee on military issues.<sup>75</sup>

The team trains constantly, including active participation in SOUTHCOM joint exercises. This enables SOUTHCOM to deploy the DJTFAC on no-notice, and exercise the team's planning abilities during crisis action planning.<sup>76</sup> The DJTFAC also brings, in addition to its joint planning capability, an organic C4I support structure. In general, the DJTFAC can provide the following support: joint CAP support to develop campaign plans and orders during contingency operations and joint training exercises, C4I augmentation, and conduct liaison amongst SOUTHCOM headquarters, components or designated JTFs, interagency, and country teams.<sup>77</sup> Assignment to the DJTFAC is a collateral duty; however, during a crisis situation it becomes the team members' primary duty. The DJTFAC is organized and employed based on a three-tier concept to meet mission requirements: Tier 1 - core cell composed of DJTFAC headquarters (chief, deputy chief, operations sergeant, and two communication specialists), and SC staff representation (J1, J2, J3, J4, J6). This core cell is capable of facilitating CAP

---

<sup>74</sup>Ibid., 3.

<sup>75</sup>Logistics Support: Once OPCODE is passed to the Commander, JTF, logistical support for the DJTFAC will be coordinated and provided by the CJTF. If deployed in support of missions other than a JTF. The DJTFAC, in support of a Country Team, will operate at or near the American Embassy (AMEMB). The DJTFAC may be required to operate in geographically remote regions from the AMEMB (e.g., disaster relief operations and humanitarian operations). For these missions, logistical support will either be provided through the Security Assistance Office (SAO), or by other organizations, depending on the contingency, designated to provide logistical support. Ibid., 4-6.

<sup>76</sup>The DJTFAC develops and synchronizes the various CAP products (i.e., warning orders, mission analysis, courses of action briefs, staff estimates, OPORDS, and synchronization matrices, etc.). Ibid., 4.

<sup>77</sup>C4I augmentation package includes tactical satellite (TACSAT) radios, international maritime satellite (INMARSAT) phone, STU III MFAX phones, digital cameras, ground positional system (GPS), lap tops computers, and portable color printers., Ibid., 4-5.

and providing limited C4I augmentation, Tier 2 - composed of tier 1, plus functional planners from the components. Tier 2 is capable of augmenting a JTF's Joint Planning Group (JPG) by bringing operational expertise on ground, air, maritime, amphibious, special operations (SOF), and TPFDD planning, and Tier 3 - includes tier 1 and 2 personnel, plus specialty augmentation including: Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Civil Affairs (CA), Engineer, Medical, Legal, and Information Operations (IO) planners, amongst others.

The tier concept of employment allows the combatant commander to commit only those resources needed for a particular mission. This focused and economy of force approach enhances flexibility within the command and protects the DJTFAC from unnecessary commitments. Additionally, although not its primary mission, the DJTFAC can deploy to any country within the AOR in support of a Country Team, interagency, or other competent authorities as directed by SOUTHCOM.<sup>78</sup>

As discussed, the DJTFAC provides a readily deployable pool of joint planners, from the unified command headquarters, to the JTF commander to facilitate planning and execution of operations in the Joint Area of Operations (JOA). Will a DJTFAC deliver as advertised? To answer this question, Chapter Four examines two MSCA operations and discusses the operational deployment of a DJTFAC in support of one of the JTFs engaged in relief operations.

---

<sup>78</sup>Intelligence support requirements: SCJ2 provides current intelligence estimates to the DJTFAC during alert and predeployment procedures. During mission planning and throughout the DJTFAC deployment, SCJ2 provides intelligence updates on the threat and characteristics of the area of operation. On order, SCJ2 provides a DSIMS team, OPCON to the DJTFAC. Ibid., 4-5.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### *Landscape of Cataclysm: Hurricanes Andrew and Mitch*

#### *Case Studies*

##### *Hurricane Andrew (August-October 1992)*

On 24 August 1992, Hurricane Andrew, a category four hurricane, crashed through southern Florida, devastating the town of Homestead, Homestead Air Force Base, Florida City, and the surrounding areas; it continued its path through the Gulf of Mexico making final landfall in Louisiana. Andrew, one of the three most devastating hurricanes to hit the United States in the twentieth century, doomed the southern Florida coast with winds exceeding 160 miles per hour, carving a 35-mile path of destruction south of Miami. It destroyed approximately 65,000 homes, leaving survivors without water, electricity, or telephone service. Furthermore, heavy debris blocked most lines of communication, making food delivery and emergency medical services (ambulance and fire services) difficult. It was considered the most damaging hurricane on record in terms of property damage and total cost (total cost in damages reached over 12 billion dollars; death toll stood at 41).<sup>79</sup>

As DOD executive agent for disaster relief, the Department of the Army designated Commander, U.S. Forces Command as the supported commander for the operation. LTG Samuel E. Ebbesen, commanding general of the Second Continental U.S. Army (2<sup>nd</sup> CONUSA) was designated commander, JTF Andrew.<sup>80</sup> The JTF staff was organized around personnel of the 2<sup>nd</sup> CONUSA, and as we will

---

<sup>79</sup>At 0500 on 24 August 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck south Florida and caused extensive damage. The Governor of Florida requested Federal assistance. The Secretary of the Army, as DOD's executive agent, directed initiation of disaster relief operations in support of the Federal Response Plan. As part of those operations, the Commander in Chief, Forces Command, directed the Second US Army to form JTF Andrew and begin humanitarian relief operations. Eventually composed of elements of all Services and both Active and Reserve forces, JTF Andrew began operations on 28 August 1992. FM 3.0, *Operations*, (Chapter 10: Support Operations: JTF Andrew - Disaster Relief in the Continental United States); available from [http:// 155.217.58.58/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-0/ch10.htm#vig10-6](http://155.217.58.58/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-0/ch10.htm#vig10-6); internet; accessed 4 November 2002.

<sup>80</sup>USCINCLANT, USCINCSOC, USCINTRANS, and the services were supporting FORSCOM. Department of the Navy, Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), *JTF Operations Since 1983* (CRM 94-4, July 1994), 149.



discuss, this arrangement caused initial challenges for the JTF. Initially, XVIII Airborne Corps provided elements of the 82d Airborne Division, which alerted and deployed to Florida within nine hours of notification. Forty-eight hours later, additional soldiers from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the 10th Mountain Division from Fort Drum, New York, joined the already deployed forces. Within five days JTF Andrew grew to 9,500 soldiers, 3,400 sailors, 800 Marines, and 1,000 airmen from the active and reserve components, including an Engineer task force from Canada (CANFOR). At the height of the operation the JTF had a total of 23,808 service members participating in the relief operation (see figure 8 for task organization).<sup>81</sup>

The mission of JTF Andrew was to conduct humanitarian support operations vicinity Miami, Florida, to facilitate follow-on relief efforts. The JTF commander's intent was to immediately begin to operate feeding and water facilities with priority to the cities of Homestead and Florida City. After assessments, the JTF planned to expand operations through the affected areas and provide assistance to other federal agencies, state/local government and organizations, including facilitating the receipt, storage, and distribution of supplies and equipment.<sup>82</sup> The endstate was defined as getting life support systems in

---

<sup>81</sup>The Second Army took the lead and Fifth Army provided support to Louisiana. ARFOR consisted of approximately 6,800 soldiers from XVIII Airborne Corps units TF All American (82d Airborne Division), TF Mountain (10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division), and 1<sup>st</sup> COSCOM; AFFOR provided personnel from the 31<sup>st</sup> TFW, 301<sup>st</sup> ARR Sqdn and 41<sup>st</sup> ARR Sqdn; NAVFOR provided approximately 3,833 sailors (TF 28 and naval mobile construction battalions); MARFOR provided a Logistics Support Group of 1,393 Marines; CANFOR provided a 61-man Engineer Task Force; a 761-man Logistics Support Element came from the U.S.AMC with augmentation from the Industrial Operations Command and the Defense Logistics Agency. Additionally, elements from the 724<sup>th</sup> Main Support Battalion from Ft. Stewart, GA, the 533<sup>rd</sup> Transportation Company from Ft. Benning, GA, the 365<sup>th</sup> Transportation Company from Ft. McClellan GA, and elements of the 80<sup>th</sup> Ordnance Battalion from Ft. Lewis, WA, were attached to the LSE. The Florida Army National Guard and Air Force National Guard remained under state control and provided approximately 5,723 and 268 personnel respectively. U.S. Army Logistics Management College, *Hurricane Andrew* (paper copy); available from at <http://www.alm.army.mil/schools/sls/ledd/comlog/lesson17.htm>; internet; accessed date unknown.

<sup>82</sup>JTF Andrew worked closely with federal, state, and local agencies to provide housing and meals for disaster victims. It operated 24 support sites that produced 35,000 meals per day. The JTF also established four life support centers that provided tents, medical care, potable drinking water, showers, housing repair materials, and donated items. Army Material Command distributed clothes, diapers, bottled water, and food. Additionally, it provided combat stress, preventive medicine, veterinary, and health facilities planning augmentation to the 44th Medical Brigade and divisional medical elements. FM 3.0, *Operations* (Chapter 10: Support Operations: *JTF Andrew - Disaster Relief in the Continental United States*); available from <http://155.217.58.58/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-0/ch10.htm#vig10-6>; internet; accessed 4 November 2002.

place and relieve initial hardships until state and local agencies could reestablish normal operations throughout the Joint Area of Operations (JOA).<sup>83</sup>




Figure 8: JTF Andrew Task Organization (Chart created by author)

The JTF concept of operations divided the JOA into three areas of operations with the forces centered on the communities in existence prior to the disaster and simultaneously incorporating all available support systems across a broad front. The objective of the JTF was to make the communities an integral part of the recovery process, thus establishing a relief system, which could be readily maintained following their initial involvement. To facilitate communication and coordination, counterpart military, state and local officials, and civil affairs teams were established to synchronize JTF operations.<sup>84</sup> The operation was conducted in three phases: Phase I (Relief Operations), provided immediate life support systems (food, water, shelter, medical, etc.) to the affected areas; Phase II (Recovery), focused on sustaining services established during Phase I, plus assisting federal, state and

<sup>83</sup>FORSCOM, *2nd CONUSA Hurricane Andrew After Action Review* (Power Point Presentation. n.d.), copy at Combined Arms Research Library (3<sup>rd</sup> floor), Eisenhower Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

local authorities reestablish public services; Phase III (Reconstruction), focused on continuing reestablishment of public services under control of non-DOD organizations, followed by redeployment of forces.<sup>85</sup> During these operations, JTF Andrew coordinated with multiple federal, state, and private interagency. These included the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Civil Air Patrol, the American Red Cross, the General Services Administration, the Public Health Service, the Department of Agriculture, the Salvation Army, the Boy Scouts of America, and numerous religious relief organizations.<sup>86</sup> Although JTF Andrew's operations were a success, demonstrating the versatility of the military and significantly contributing to the relief and reconstruction efforts of the affected areas, these operations did not take place without problems.<sup>87</sup> We will examine some of the salient lessons learned in flexibility, interoperability and unity of effort.

Flexibility: The JTF was challenged by the lack of trained and educated joint planners and functional experts. From the beginning of the operation, it was evident that there was a lack of understanding on how to conduct joint military relief operations. For instance, 2<sup>nd</sup> CONUSA headquarters had extensive experience working with FEMA and supporting relief operations, but very limited experience conducting joint operations; conversely, XVIII Airborne Corps and the Marine Expeditionary Force headquarters were experienced in joint operations, but lacked experience in dealing with the federal

---

<sup>84</sup>Ibid.

<sup>85</sup>During this operation, the JTF executed 1,014 sorties carrying over 19,000 tons of mission support materials. Additionally, approximately 900,000 meals were provided and over 80,000 tons of humanitarian supplies were moved into the area by air, sea, and over land. JTF units erected over 1,000 tents and provided medical services to over 67,000 patients. Four life support centers were constructed, providing mass care for 2,400 people per day for approximately 2 months. Over 6 million cubic yards of debris were removed, and 98 schools were repaired. Moreover, a mobile radio station was established to provide emergency information to the local population and to provide route information to assist convoys as they arrive. FM 3-0, *Operations*, 10-6, and *JTF Andrew - Disaster Relief in the Continental United States*; available from <http://155.217.58.58/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-0/ch10.htm#vig10-6>; internet; accessed 4 November 2002.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid.

<sup>87</sup>The accomplishments of JTF Andrew cannot be understated, as this was the first time a JTF has been activated and employed in support of disaster relief in CONUS in history. Furthermore, JTF Andrew was responsible for C2 of the largest peacetime deployment of DOD forces in CONUS (approx. 23,800 service members from all services). *Joint Task Force Andrew, After Action Report: Overview Executive Summary*, 1.

interagency apparatus. The JTF struggled initially as it was trying to form into a cohesive and effective organization.<sup>88</sup>

The JTF staff was organized around personnel of the 2<sup>nd</sup> CONUSA and they were, for the most part, inexperienced in joint operations.<sup>89</sup> The J-3 staff organization began with 2<sup>nd</sup> CONUSA's Deputy Chief for Operations (DCSOPS) and over a 48-hour period slowly increased to 9 personnel. It was an evolutionary process, which involved painstaking changes, sometimes occurring on an hourly basis. This impacted on the initial DOD force requirements for the operation, as the staff was challenged attempting to determine what was needed. Furthermore, this was exacerbated by unreliable damage assessments from the civil sector. The breakout of J-3 plans into a J-5 directorate affected the timeliness of the final J-3 organization needed to support a matured JTF. Moreover, The JTF had three different J-3s in a 48-hour period, impacting on the effectiveness of the staff.<sup>90</sup> It took the JTF approximately seven days to establish a coherent operations and message center and establish efficient procedures, especially how to manage and flow information to key decision-makers. Overall joint staff coordination procedures, and the development and issuance of orders were areas of concern.<sup>91</sup> Employment of liaison officers was sporadic, but effective when used.<sup>92</sup> Due to unfamiliarity with joint requirements, the development of the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) for the operation was slow, impacting on logistics planning and push of forces and supplies into theater. Development of a

---

<sup>88</sup>JTF Operations Since 1983, 152.

<sup>89</sup>Personnel requirements, beyond 2<sup>nd</sup> CONUSA headquarters, to expand the JTF were filled from 2<sup>nd</sup> CONUSA Readiness Group and advisory assets with shortfall forwarded to FORSCOM. Department of Defense, "Joint Task Force Andrew, After Action Report: Overview Executive Summary" (Paper copy, n.d), 3.

<sup>90</sup>FORSCOM, *After Action Review, Operation Disaster Relief: JTF Andrew* (HQ JTF Andrew, 1992), JULLS Number: 92352-55018 (00012).

<sup>91</sup>Ibid., JULLS Number: 91426-81149 (00001) and #91427-67750 (00007).

<sup>92</sup>Component LNOs provided critical coordination and facilitated information flow to the JTF HQ, Ibid., 7.

workable TPFDD occupied a large part of the JTF's staff efforts at the onset of the operation, in fact curtailing the JTF commander's flexibility as forces and equipment needed were slow arriving.<sup>93</sup>

Interoperability: The JTF's ability to communicate, coordinate and synchronize diverse and complex DOD and interagency assets was initially wanting. Many of the major participants (federal, state, local, and private volunteer organizations) lacked familiarity with the equipment, capabilities, and employment procedures of each other. Lack of interoperability occurred primarily in three areas. First, some units in the JTF had inadequate knowledge of FEMA, the FRP and ESFs; conversely, federal agencies lacked understanding of the military capabilities and limitations. This caused duplication efforts and mismatching of capabilities.<sup>94</sup> Second, communication assets were not adequate for the JOA. When JTF Andrew headquarters arrived, it discovered that its communications equipment was not adequate to support all communications requirements. Although 2<sup>nd</sup> CONUSA deployed its contingency communications package to support the operation, it was tailored only to support the Defense Coordination Element (DCE). It was not robust enough to support a headquarters four to five times as large as the DCE. This caused delays in reporting and coordinating actions among JTF units and Federal agencies.<sup>95</sup> Third, although a Joint Information Center (JIC) was established, there was lack

---

<sup>93</sup>Required units and capabilities were not planned for or included early on in the flow, especially logistics and engineer units. Furthermore, joint logistics was challenged by the selection of aerial ports of debarkation, main depots, and distribution procedures. *JTF Operations Since 1983*, 154; *Joint Task Force Andrew, AAR: Overview Executive Summary*, 9; and *JTF Andrew Logistics AAR* (paper copy, n.d., 1999), 1-2; available from <http://call.army.mil/call/newsletters/93%2D6/cap3.htm>; internet; date accessed unknown.

<sup>94</sup>Lack of familiarity with the FRP and ESFs caused the JTF to perform duties, which were outside the scope of ESFs, including providing medical support (ESF 8) and sheltering disaster victims (ESF 6). The required coordination between FEMA and DOD detailing specific operations within the FRP/ESFs was insufficient during the initial stages of the operation resulting in extending DOD involvement into mission areas that other federal agencies were responsible. Other interoperability issues involved the Army's CH47 helicopters lack of qualification to take off and land on board USN ships (much of the refrigerated food was lifted by helicopter off the USS Sylvania and Ponce. Although there were about 90 Army CH47s in the area, their lack of qualification to land/take off from ships, place the burden on USN CH-46 helicopters). Ibid, 6 and *JTF Operations Since 1983*, 54.

<sup>95</sup>2<sup>nd</sup> CONUSA deployed a communications team via C12 aircraft to the DCE operations center. They deployed with a cellular phone, one portable facsimile machine, three High Frequency (HF) radios, five hand-held VHF radios, one mobile 30-watt VHF radio, one VHF station, three UHF hand-held radios, one generator, and one laptop computer with external drive and printer. Hurricane Andrew devastated the communications infrastructure throughout the affected area. The priority for restoring communications went to providing telephone lines to the disaster assistance centers, life support centers, and mobile kitchen units. Integration of the tactical networks occurred with tactical satellite (TACSAT) links and message center switching. JTF units could interface down the chain, but integrated trunking did not occur. As part of the Federal Response Plan (FRP), there was in effect a

of an effective command and control system for the private voluntary organizations (PVO) to coordinate required actions in the affected areas with FEMA and the JTF.<sup>96</sup>

Unity of Effort: Despite all challenges and the slow and frustrating start, the JTF was able to remained focused on critical tasks coordinating and attaining cooperation among all agencies involved. However, two unity of effort issues initially confronted by the JTF were joint airspace management and joint transportation operations and sustainment. The JTF did not designate a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), nor organized a Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC) to coordinate and synchronize the large number of air assets involved in the relief operation, causing the JTF components to coordinate directly with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for air routes and waivers.<sup>97</sup> The JTF did not designate a Joint Transportation Officer (JTO) nor established a Joint Movement Control Center (JMCC) to coordinate essential transportation requirements across the JOA. To compound this issue, liaison officers (LNO) were not deployed to the U.S. Transportation Military Command, the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), or the Air Mobility Command (AMC).<sup>98</sup>

---

communications plan to establish telecommunications responsibilities and procedures -the National Plan for Telecommunications Support in Non-Wartime Emergencies. However, the JTF staff didn't know that the LFA for coordinating telecommunications support to relief agencies was the Office of Science and Technology Policy (ESF No. 2-communications). Once realized, Second U.S. Army provided a military liaison officer to the Office of Science and Technology Policy and this proved invaluable and contributed to the success of the disaster assistance mission. *Joint Task Force Andrew, After Action Report: Overview Executive Summary*, 10, and JULLS 91427-67750 (00007/ 9 October 1992), 7.

<sup>96</sup>The JTF PAO office was established on 27 August 1992 and collated with the JTF command group. The JIC, which served as a clearinghouse for dissemination of information and coordination among more than ten federal agencies, PVOs and media, found initially its standing operating procedures for disaster relief wanting. *Ibid*, 5-6 and *JTF Andrew AAR: Overview Executive Summary*, 14.

<sup>97</sup>A JFACC could have coordinated with the local FAA and the JAOC could have assumed C2 of the disaster area airspace with USAF or USN combat control teams and mobile air traffic control equipment. Once realized that joint airspace procedures were needed, they were established after meeting with FAA representatives, JTF services components, USCG, and Florida Army and Air National Guard representatives. After this meeting Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) were developed and distributed to all airspace users. *Ibid*, 13.

<sup>98</sup>The JTF did not take advantage of two systems designated to facilitate deployments. The Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the Transportation Coordinator and Execution System (TCACCIS). These systems were available to the JTF but the staff was not familiar with them. Moreover, the WorldWide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) was not employed. *Ibid*, 13-14.

JTF Andrew was faced with the unprecedented task of employing a large joint force in support of disaster relief in CONUS in history. Although the JTF initially encountered challenges in terms of joint planning expertise and interoperability, it was able to maintain unity of effort during operations, and was successful in directing the largest peacetime deployment of DOD forces in CONUS.<sup>99</sup> Would a trained and educated joint augmentation cell have facilitated the JTF's operations? To answer this question, next we will examine JTF Aguila's operations during Hurricane Mitch.

### ***Hurricane Mitch (October 1998-September 1999)***

On October 21, 1998, Hurricane Mitch, the fourth-strongest hurricane ever recorded in the Atlantic and considered the worst natural disaster to strike Central America this century, made landfall on Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador. The magnitude of the devastation was tremendous; over 10,000 people killed; 13,000 missing; 60 percent of the infrastructure in Honduras, Nicaragua and Guatemala destroyed; over 300 bridges and miles of road washed away. About two million people were homeless, either displaced or their homes destroyed.<sup>100</sup>

The operation was conducted in three phases: Phase I -Emergency Response (28 October-28 November 1998), focused on life-saving and emergency delivery of relief supplies and medical assistance. The first SOUTHCOM unit to respond was Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-B) in Honduras with augmentation from U.S. Army South (USARSO) and the U.S. Air Force's 24<sup>th</sup> Wing, both stationed in Panama.<sup>101</sup> Soon JTF-B became overwhelmed by the magnitude of the task and the combatant

---

<sup>99</sup> *Joint Task Force Andrew, After Action Report: Overview Executive Summary*, 1.

<sup>100</sup> The effort was the biggest task undertaken in the context of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations by SOUTHCOM in recent history. Soldiers deployed to the region as part of JTF B, formed to coordinate the military's ongoing response in Honduras. JTF-A was established in El Salvador to coordinate military relief efforts in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Initially, a military base of operations was established at Soto Cano Air Force Base in Honduras. Forward bases were then established in locations such as La Ceiba, Honduras, and Guatemala City, Guatemala. This facilitated flights by 39 helicopters and six fixed-wing aircraft. The U.S. spent about \$35 million on the emergency assistance phase, funded under a Presidential drawdown of \$30 million. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA), *Hurricane Mitch Fact Sheet*, available from <http://www.met-office.gov.uk/sec2/sec2cyclone/tcbulletins/mitch.html>; accessed 2 Oct 02.

<sup>101</sup> It would have taken U.S. forces up to four weeks to effect the rescue process in Honduras had it not been for JTF-B. They saved an estimated 1,000 lives in the days immediately following the storm. JTF-B was established in 1981 at Soto Cano Airfield in Honduras. Its primary missions are theater engagement, support to

commander decided to stand up an additional JTF. Under the auspices of SOUTHCOM, COL (P) Virgil L. Packett II, Assistant Division Commander (Support) of the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky, was designated Commander, JTF Aguila. The 593<sup>rd</sup> Corps Support Group, Fort Lewis, Washington, was tasked with providing the JTF's primary staff; however, as we will discuss, they were late arriving in theater. Figure 9 shows JTF-A Task Organization.<sup>102</sup>




Figure 9: JTF Aguila Task Organization (Chart created by author)

counterdrug operations, and support to disaster relief. The JTF includes aviation (both fixed and rotary-wing), engineer units, and logistics, communications, and security assets. Melinda Hofstetter, *Building Alliances Amidst Destruction: A Status Report From Hurricane Mitch* (Joint Military Intelligence College, 2000), 5 and 15-16.

<sup>102</sup> Active component units deployed to Central America for the build up to support relief efforts associated with Hurricane Mitch: 24<sup>th</sup> USAF Wing (Howard, AFB, Panama), USAF 819th Civil Engineering Squadron, Malmstrom USAF Base, Mont.; USAF 820th Civil Engineering Squadron, Nellis AFB, Nev; II USMC Expeditionary Force, Cherry Point and Camp LeJeune, N.C.; USMC 2nd Force Service Support Group, Cherry Point and Camp LeJeune, N.C.; USMC 8th Engineer Support Battalion, Camp LeJeune, N.C; Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 7, Roosevelt Roads, P.R. ,and Gulfport, Miss. ; Army 1st Corps Support Command, 18th Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, N.C; Army 539th Corps Support Group, Fort Lewis, Wash; Army 55th Engineer Company, Fort Riley, Kan; Army 46th Engineer Battalion, Fort Polk, La; Army Headquarters, 36th Engineer Group, Fort Benning, Ga; Army 63rd Combat Support Equipment Company, Fort Benning, Ga; Army 68th Combat Support Equipment Company, Fort Hood, Texas. In addition, a large number of Guard and Reserve units were committed to the operation. Ibid., 17.



Phase II: Rehabilitation (28 November-20 February 1999), focused on repairing the infrastructure, supplying medical needs and portable water so that host nations could complete the rest of the repairs on their own. During this phase the JTF conducted 219 strategic airlift flights moving over 8,000 tons of equipment and supplies. Additionally, over 900 fixed-wing hours and 4,400 rotary-wing hours were executed moving in excess of eight million pounds of supplies and over one million gallons of portable water. Moreover, this phase saw the construction of 145 kilometers of main road, including 18 bypasses and the construction of four bridges, two medical clinics, four schools, and refurbishment of four wells.<sup>103</sup>

Phase III: Restoration (20 February-1 September 1999), focused on long-term efforts to permanently repair infrastructure, boost the economy, and mitigate damage to the greatest extent possible. The U.S. military role decreased in the final phase, as the role of non-governmental organizations and interagency groups increased laying the groundwork to assist the affected nations in transitioning to pre-hurricane conditions.<sup>104</sup> Operation *Fuerte Apoyo* (Strong Support) provides several lessons learned in terms of flexibility, interoperability and unity of effort during JTF operations.

Flexibility: Once the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) completed initial damage assessments, the real magnitude of the damages began to materialize along with the realization that the relief effort would be much larger and take longer than previously assessed. SOUTHCOM decided to designate a second JTF to reduce the span of control of JTF-B to enable it to concentrate efforts in

---

<sup>103</sup>The JTF assisted in relief efforts on a number of fronts. Dozens of US military helicopters and aircraft operated daily and delivered over 2.5 million pounds of relief supplies (food, water, blankets, sheeting, sanitation services); additional helicopters arrived in the area on November 12, bringing the total to 39. Support included helicopters, engineering, bridge companies and road-building units, medical detachments and supplies, a field hospital, and 11 water purification systems. Dozens of US military helicopters and 13 fixed-wing aircraft operated daily and delivered over 1.3 million pounds of relief supplies as of 16 November 1998. Ten Chinook heavy-lift helicopters arrived in the region on November 12, bringing the total to 39. SEABEE and other units cleared and repaired key roads. The military deployed a bridge company to the region to supplement efforts. The United States airlifted an initial 850 metric tons of food on 18 flights to Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala, and another 6,000 metric tons arrived by ship before the end of November. Ibid., 5.

<sup>104</sup>Although it was estimated that it would have taken ten years or more at a cost of \$400 to 800 billion, SOUTHCOM continued assisting with restoration of the infrastructure and economic rebuilding through a series of exercises known as the "New Horizons." Ibid., 7.

Honduras (the country most affected by the hurricane); JTF-A was formed to assist Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua.<sup>105</sup> Units designated to support the JTF were slow coming, especially personnel designated to form the JTF's coordinating staff and Joint Planning Group. On request from the JTF commander, the SOUTHCOM DJTFAC deployed in support of JTF Aguila.<sup>106</sup> The DJTFAC, bringing a strong regional perspective and knowledge of joint operations, took over as the de facto JTF staff developing plans and facilitating execution of all relief operations. The DJTFAC was instrumental in translating the JTF commander's intent for the use of joint forces in the JOA, recommending critical LNOs deployed to MILGPs and OFDA headquarters to facilitate disaster relief requests for support, and enhancing cooperation and synchronization among the JTF components, local authorities and interagency.<sup>107</sup>

Interoperability: JTF-A had its share of challenges with communications. Although the DJTFAC deployed with part of its standard C4I augmentation equipment, the DJTFAC's J2 had deployed without a dedicated, portable automated data processing/communications package that was secure collateral data and voice exchange capable.<sup>108</sup> Consequently, Internet access was delayed for two weeks and secret

---

<sup>105</sup> *A Status Report From Hurricane Mitch, 15-16, and U.S. Southcom, Disaster Relief Operations: Hurricane George and Mitch: After Action Report* (SOUTHCOM, Crisis Action Center, Miami, FL, n.d.), 4.

<sup>106</sup> On 11 Dec 98, COL (P) Packett decided to deploy to El Salvador; however, USACOM had not identified a JTF staff for the operation yet. COL (P) Packett requested the DJTFAC deploy as an "advance" staff to help establish JTF-A headquarters. Although its mission was to augment the JTF staff, the DJTFAC found no designated JTF staff upon arrival and became the de facto JTF staff for approximately 30 days following deployment until the primary JTF staff from the 593<sup>rd</sup> Corps Support Group, and elements of I Corps, Fort Lewis, Washington finally deployed to theater. U.S. Southcom, *After Action Review: Operation Fuerte Apoyo* (Miami, Florida, 1999), 1-2.

<sup>107</sup> On 14 Nov, the DJTFAC arrived at Comalpa AFB and established expeditionary life support in austere host nation facilities. TACSAT and IMARSAT communications were established and on 15 Nov, the JTF's Joint Operations and Intelligence Center (JOIC) was operational. The DJTFAC produced and issued all orders for the operation, including commander's estimate to SOUTHCOM, warning orders and the JTF OPORD, which the DJTFAC presented to all JTF-A components and task forces, in addition to the myriad of tasks associated with running a JOIC. Ibid., 17, and *Disaster Relief Operations: AAR: Hurricane George and Mitch*, 6, 11-12, 19.

<sup>108</sup> The DJTFAC deployed with cell phones, STU III and INMARSAT. The J6 has a secure collateral data and voice exchange system, but it was used for C2 purposes. Ibid., 25.

Internet (SIPRNET) access became available only by the time the DJTFAC was to redeploy. Once the system was operational, reports and imagery were pulled through the SIPRNET and the Trojan Spirit.<sup>109</sup> One of the greatest challenges encountered during Operation *Fuerte Apoyo* was how to formulate the "humanitarian battlespace" picture across the JOA. The primary means was relying on split-base communication support from SOUTHCOM Joint Intelligence Center Support Cell at Miami to enable JTFs Aguila and Bravo to contact J2 representatives at the Crisis Action Team (CAT) cell 24 hours a day.<sup>110</sup> The challenge occurred trying to maintain the same level of connectivity with all JTF elements dispersed throughout theater and key host nation and State Department organizations.<sup>111</sup> To lessen the shortcoming, the DJTFAC coordinated the exploitation of Open Source Intelligence and deployed liaison officers with the Defense Attaches and Military Groups (MILGRP) of the three countries affected.<sup>112</sup> Additionally, USSOUTHCOM deployed additional staff officers to the JOA to perform as LNOs to gather additionally information needed by the combatant commander.<sup>113</sup> The early deployment of LNOs became a critical information and coordination source for the JTFs and the combatant commander; thus, filling the void caused by the communication shortfalls, and enhancing interoperability among major agencies.<sup>114</sup>

---

<sup>109</sup>Trojan Spirit (Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal) is an advanced mobile communications system for intelligence dissemination. During Operation *Fuerte Apoyo* it supported split-based operations at field sites, disseminated processed intelligence, and forwarded threat communications signals. All of which was very useful to the support of JTF-A. The Trojan Spirit was late deploying to the JOA due to operational conflicts with the units owning the system, which will engaged in supporting Operation Desert Fox. Ibid., 25.

<sup>110</sup>Operating in a non-traditional environment, the DJTFAC showed its adaptability and creativity by developing its own disaster relief symbology producing a common joint picture of status of population centers, flooded areas, isolated population areas, damaged and/or destroyed bridges, landslides, wind damaged areas, displaced civilian camps, airfields and road status. This information was shared with the SC JOIC on a daily basis. Ibid., 17, 22-23.

<sup>111</sup>Ibid., 14.

<sup>112</sup>Ibid., 25.

<sup>113</sup>For instance, USSOUTHCOM deployed logistics, engineer, public affairs and surgeon office's LNOs to the JOA to do assessments in each country and provide photographic information. The J2 updated infrastructure data through these USSOUTHCOM sources and their situation reports, which added resolution to reports coming from the JTF HQs. Ibid., 25.

<sup>114</sup>Ibid., passim.

Unity of Effort – Major challenges occurred during Joint Reception Staging Onward Movement and Integration (JRSO&I) planning and Threat Vulnerability Assessment (TVA) at aerial ports of debarkation (APOD) and seaports of debarkation (SPOD). The JTF's JPG planned for three different SPODs and APODs to effectively support the affected countries; however, the implementation of the plan was held up by subordinate units' unfamiliarity with JRSO&I procedures until assistance arrived from MTC and procedures were deconflicted.<sup>115</sup> This notwithstanding, with three counties in desperate need of help, 20 different countries providing support and the complexity of working with State Department, host nations, NGOs and IOs, the task of maintaining unity of effort was extraordinary; JTF Aguila was able to maintain mission focus and accomplish all critical tasks during the operation. At the JTF-level, the employment of the DJTAFB proved to be a force multiplier, facilitating coordination and cooperation among the diverse cast of players.<sup>116</sup>

## **Lessons Learned**

There were similarities between JTF Andrew and Aguila. Both organizations were not "standing JTFs" - they were assembled in haste and did not have the benefit of working with their staff and components before their actual deployments; consequently, they had similar initial challenges trying to organize into a cohesive and effective organization. Maintaining interoperability and communications across their JOAs challenged both; however, both were able to maintain unity of effort during the

---

<sup>115</sup>Part of the problem was that the JPG did not have anyone fully trained on JRSO&I and was unable to articulate better the requirements to the subordinate units. This was further complicated by communication challenges with the Joint Logistics Resource Center (JLRC) and Joint Movement Center (JMC), which were established at SOUTHCOM HQ in Miami, especially impacting on timeliness of intra-theater airlift requests. To facilitate executing JRSO&I, the JPG requested assistance from the Military Traffic Command (MTC) and JTF-B, Ibid., 24-25.

<sup>116</sup>During Hurricane Mitch the major players included Department of Defense, Department of State, FEMA, OFDA, U.S. Embassies, U.S. MILGPs, SOUTHCOM, U.S. civilian and military agencies, 40 plus international agencies (including United Nations, International Relief Organizations, World Bank, CNN, multiple press) and Host-Nation (National Emergency Management Organizations). Ibid., 25.

operations. Both responded to the largest natural disasters on record, both in CONUS and in Central America, and were instrumental in saving thousands of lives, mitigating suffering and salvaging critical infrastructure. Furthermore, operating in austere conditions and working within the complexity and dynamics of their operational environments, both showed tremendous capabilities and exemplified the determination of the U.S. Armed Forces.

There were two salient differences between the JTFs. First, in terms of flexibility, unlike JTF Andrew, JTF Aquila employed a DJTFAC, which was proficient in joint operations - unlike the initial joint staff of JTF Andrew - and was able to match joint capabilities with needs in the JOA. The DJTFAC brought the joint resident expertise required to facilitating joint operations, allowing the JTF commander to concentrate in the overall support plan. Second, in terms of interoperability, although both had communication challenges, JTF Aquila experienced more success than JTF Andrew did, due to its knowledge in joint and interagency operations and aggressive use of LNOs to compensate for communication shortcomings.

As we compare and contrast both JTFs, three major lessons learned become evident. First, in terms of enhancing flexibility to the JTF commander, having a knowledgeable and experienced joint staff is critical to the effectiveness and efficiency of a JTF, especially if the JTF is a temporary designated organization. The initial staff in JTF Andrew was inexperienced in joint operations impacting in the JTF's ability to rapidly establish a functional operations center and coordinate operations. Their unfamiliarity with key documents like the TPFDD impacted on the planning effort and flow of critical units and resources into the JOA; furthermore, their sporadic use of LNOs initially hindered the JTF commander's ability to synchronize operations among all key agencies. Conversely, JTF Aquila had the benefit of having a knowledgeable and experienced staff - the SOUTHCOM DJTFAC - becoming contributors from the onset of the operation. The DJTFAC developed all plans and orders (including redeployment orders with TPFDD), enhanced the formulation of the "humanitarian battlespace" by developing non-existing common situational templates (SITE MP) for disaster relief operations, and maximized open source intelligence by deploying LNOs to components, country teams, and OFDA.

Second, in terms of interoperability, establishing, enhancing, and maintaining communication among higher headquarters, JTF units and key agencies, and understanding capabilities and limitations of joint units and interagency is vital for the synchronization of operations. Both JTFs were initially challenged with communications; JTF Andrew deployed with inadequate communications equipment and was unable to achieve integrated trunking and JTF Mitch's J2 deployed without dedicated ADP equipment failing to attain SIPRNET access for two weeks. Moreover, the staff in JTF Andrew (2<sup>nd</sup> CONUSA) was initially unfamiliar with joint operations and forces' capabilities, and some units in the JTF were unfamiliar with FEMA and the Federal Response Plan (FRP). Conversely, the DJTFAC in support of JTF Aguila was familiar with joint operations, understood foreign disaster relief procedures, and knew capabilities and limitations of the units assigned and interagency involved in the relief effort.

Third, while conducting joint operations - especially those involving interagency - attaining and maintaining unity of effort is perhaps one of the most important and challenging tasks faced by a JTF in support of relief operations. In terms of coordination, JTF Andrew was challenged initially as some components were unfamiliar with the FRP and the Emergency Support Functions (ESF) causing duplication of effort in some instances. Additionally, the decision not to establish a JFACC and JAOC impacted in the activities necessary to efficiently manage the airspace and air assets in the JOA. Conversely, although JTF Aguila's unfamiliarity with JRSO&I operations caused initial delays in the deployment of personnel and equipment into the JOA, the JTF was successful from the start, as the staff (DJTFAC)'s familiarity with joint operations, foreign disaster assistance procedures, and interagency operations was instrumental in achieving coordination among all key actors. Remarkably, despite all challenges, both JTFs were very successful in achieving cooperation among units and key agencies, and accomplishing the colossal tasks at hand.

Having discussed NORTHCOM's mission and operational environment - as they relate to CM support operations during MACA - and the positive impact caused by the employment of a DJTFAC during a relief operation, Chapter Five provides the monograph's conclusion, answers the research question, and renders recommendations for the organization of a DJTFAC in NORTHCOM.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### Conclusion and Recommendations

When we understand something, we no longer see it as chaotic or complex.

Jamshid Gharajedachi, *Systems Thinking: Managing Chaos and Complexity*.<sup>117</sup>

#### Conclusion

The central focus of this monograph has been conveying the plausibility of organizing a rapidly deployable augmentation cell in the newly-created U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to facilitate providing military support to civil authorities during consequence management (CM) operations. As examined, the complexity of the operational environment will place immense pressure on the combatant commander, his staff, and subordinate commanders. Once a disaster or a catastrophe occurs, there will be little room for preparation or inaction; therefore, the command must be ready to support civil authorities across the entire spectrum of Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) operations. The lessons learned from Hurricanes Andrew and Mitch show that at the onset of operations, in addition to working through the complexity and friction inherent to the operational environment, the JTF commanders would be challenged attempting to bring integration, alignment and synergy into their staff and subordinate units. Additionally, maintaining critical communication nodes and employing trained and educated LNOs are vital to achieving interoperability among JTF units and interagency. Therefore, the JTFs must be proficient on interagency and joint disciplines critical to commanding, controlling and directing personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, communications, and civil-military operations in the JOA. They must work through these challenges while concurrently executing a myriad of tasks critical to the very survival of human beings.

In answer to the research question - given a disaster or catastrophe in the NORTHCOM AOR, would a DJTFAC increase effectiveness and efficiency in the JTF staff during planning and execution of CM

---

<sup>117</sup>Jamshid Gharajedaghi, *Systems Thinking: Managing Chaos and Complexity*, 25.

support operations? The response is yes; a rapidly deployable, trained and educated, joint staff augmentation cell will increase effectiveness and efficiency in the JTF staff by enhancing flexibility, interoperability and unity of effort during the conduct of CM support operations. The JTF commander will benefit from having at his disposal a rapidly deployable, educated and trained group of joint and combined planners from the unified command headquarters. This cell, under his operational control, can act as a "plug in" to his staff, immediately contributing to the overall effort of the JTF. The DJTFAC can become the initial nucleus of the Joint Planning Group that will translate the JTF commander's intent through the production of a campaign plan designed to meet the objective of the lead federal agency in charged of the overall operation.<sup>118</sup> The DJTFAC brings to the JOA, theater and subject-matter expertise, joint and combined planning capability, and command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) augmentation.

The employment of a DJTFAC will increase effectiveness and efficiency in the JTF; thus, enhancing the JTF commander's flexibility by providing trained joint and combined planners and liaison officers capable of developing feasible, suitable and acceptable courses of action in addition to the myriad of products associated with joint and combined military operations. Additionally, a DJTFAC will enhance interoperability in the JTF by bringing practical knowledge on how to integrate and employ joint capabilities, including systems and forces, and the ability to communicate and synchronize diverse and complex DOD and interagency operations. Moreover, the DJTAFAC will enhance unity of effort in the JTF by facilitating coordination and cooperation among units, departments, and agencies to attain a common understanding of the overall aim, and more importantly, how to attain it.

---

<sup>118</sup>The broad term "campaign planning" applies to CM and MACA operations. A campaign plan is "a plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. It describes how a series of related joint major operations are arranged in time, space, and purpose to achieve a strategic or operational objective with available resources. It fundamentals, which certainly apply to CM/MACA operations, orient on an adversary's center of gravity (COG), protects friendly COG, is designed to achieve simultaneous and synchronize employment of all available land, sea, air, space and special operations forces, clearly defines an end state, mission success, and mission termination criteria, and serves as the basis for subordinate planning." JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 61, and JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations (Draft)*, IV-I thru IV-3.



## Recommendations

U.S. NORTHCOM organizes, resources and employs a standing DJTFAC in support of JTFs engaged in CM support operations. Although NORTHCOM could use selected aspects of the PACOM and SOUTHCOM DJTFAC models, the command should design its DJTFAC using a systems approach tailored to meet the uniqueness of the AOR and the missions likely to be executed in support of LFAs. Dr. Jamshid Gharajedaghi, in his book, *System Thinking: Managing Chaos and Complexity*, states that the “distinction of systems thinking is its focus on the whole.”<sup>119</sup> Therefore, designing an effective and efficient organization has to take into account the interaction of structure, function, and process; this holistic and integrated approach, ascertains Gharajedaghi, is the “enabling light” of systems methodology.<sup>120</sup> In providing guidance on how to design a solution, he states: “designing a solution starts by assuming that the system to be redesigned has been destroyed overnight but that everything else in the environment reins unchanged.”<sup>121</sup> Using this systems approach, this section discusses the interaction of structure, function, and processes required in designing the NORTHCOM’s DJTFAC.

The first step is assessing the system’s boundaries and stakeholders.<sup>122</sup> The system boundaries comprise the NORTHCOM AOR (as discussed in Chapter Two, this translate to the interaction and interdependency of unique geo-political, social-cultural, and legal considerations). Key stakeholders include Government (National Command Authority and Congress), DOD, the public, news media, and

---

<sup>119</sup>Jamshid Gharajedaghi, *Systems Thinking: Managing Chaos and Complexity*, 109.

<sup>120</sup>IAW Gharajedaghi, “structure defines components and their relationship, which in this context is synonymous with input, means, and cause. Function defines the outcome, or results produced, which is synonymous with outputs, ends, and effect. Process explicitly defines the sequence of activities and the know-how required to produce the outcome. Structure, function, and process, along with their containing environment, form the interdependent set of variables that define the whole.” Ibid., 110.

<sup>121</sup>IAW Gharajedaghi “The designers have to been given the challenge to design the system from scratch. Design aims to do the following: (1) Produce an order-of-magnitude improvement in the throughput of the system. The basic assumption is that the cost and performance of any system are essentially design driven. (2) Create a shared understanding among critical actors. The best way to learn a system is to design one. (3) Generate ownership and commitment, (4) Dissolve conflict and create win/win solutions. (5) Convert obstructions into opportunities.” Ibid., 129.

<sup>122</sup>A system’s boundary is defined by understanding the behavior of its stakeholder; a stakeholder of an organization is any individual or group who is directly affected by what the organization does and therefore has a stake in its performance. Ibid., 130-131.

interagency - including federal, state, local, non-government organizations (NGO), private voluntary organizations (PVO), and even international organizations (IO). Next to consider, and perhaps the most important aspect in the design process, is defining the purpose or the mission of the system.<sup>123</sup> The purpose of the NORTHCOM DJTAF is to facilitate CM operations by providing trained and educated joint and combined planners, trained and educated LNOs, and C4I augmentation to a designated JTF commander. The definition of success is a noticeable enhancement in flexibility, interoperability and unity of effort in the supported JTF. Next to consider are the intended functions of this organization - what is it intended to do.<sup>124</sup> Here, we're referring to the physical and intellectual capacity to conduct effective and efficient joint and combined planning and operations, and/or conduct liaison duties, in support of a JTF engaged in supporting a LFA during CM operations across the entire MACA spectrum (support to civil disturbances; law enforcement; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, high-yielding explosions; counterdrug operations; sensitive support, and disaster relief). Therefore, designing this organization has to take into account the requirement of having not only knowledge and experience in joint and combined operations, but having specialists on each of the six major MACA fields, and expertise in support requirements critical to all twelve FRP's Emergency Support Functions (ESF). Meeting these requirements makes this organization uniquely qualified and capable for operations in the NORTHCOM's AOR.

The purpose and functionality of the organization tie directly to the critical organizational processes: integration, alignment and synergy.<sup>125</sup> It correlates to the professionalism, subject-matter expertise,

---

<sup>123</sup>Purpose relates to four basic concepts: (1) definition of the business: What is the product and what it's supposed to do and for whom, (2) strategic intent: Can be formulated as a core competency; the attitude of the organization as a whole, (3) measure of success: measured, usually, by the success of its product divisions, (4) cores values: set of competencies. Ibid., 132-137.

<sup>124</sup>Functions relate to "the group of customers for whom the desired properties of the product is more compatible with organization's potential capabilities." Whose problem are we trying to solve? What solutions are we offering? How do we access the target customer? Ibid., 138-139.

<sup>125</sup>Critical processes include (1) organizational processes - creating synergy; (2) Throughput processes - operational efficiency; (3) Latent processes -creation of potential. The essence of synergy is management of interactions. It's concerned with the development and implementation of processes, systems, and incentives that produce cooperative efforts and alliances that will make the whole of the value chain greater than the sum of its

responsiveness, cohesiveness, and overall synergy that the organization brings to the table - the ability to rapidly deploy and integrate into a JTF staff becoming instant participants and contributors to the overall success of the operation. The final element to be considered are the throughput processes - those concerned with the actual output of the organization - the recommended structure.<sup>126</sup>

The recommended NORTHCOM's DJTFAC must have three major attributes. First, it must understand and be able to operate in a joint and combined environment (this becomes critical due to the potentiality of operations extending to Mexico and Canada). This requires training and education on joint and combined doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) related to predeployment, movement, deployment, reception, staging, outward movement, integration, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of joint forces.<sup>127</sup> Second, it must have knowledge and understanding of the major MACA missions and support required by lead federal agencies in all ESFs.<sup>128</sup> Third, it must be able to enhance and sustain interoperability and unity of effort among all major actors by becoming proficient in joint communication systems and interagency operations.<sup>129</sup> As shown in Figure 10 (NORTHCOM DJTFAC Task Organization), the DJTFAC should be designed and employed using a three-tier system where each tier provides a special set of skills to the JTF commander. This economy of force approach provides for a gradual and flexible response capability enabling the combatant commander to deploy only those assets absolutely necessary to support the particular mission on hand. Tier 1 is the core of the DJTFAC; it is composed of a headquarters section and functional joint planners, which are also knowledgeable in combined operations.<sup>130</sup> Functional planners provide the knowledge base for

---

parts. Integration represents a scientific orientation (looking for similarities among things that are apparently difference) emphasizing instrumental values and signifying tendencies toward increased order, uniformity, conformity, collectivity, and morphostasis (maintenance of structure). Ibid., 92, 131, 143, 225.

<sup>126</sup>In the context of designing an organization's architecture, two requirements must be met (1) Technological feasibility—all of the technologies involved in the design of the throughput processes must be available. (2) Operational viability—the system design must be viable in the existing environment. Ibid., 143.

<sup>127</sup>Joint Pub 5-00.2, *passim*.

<sup>128</sup>DODD 3025.15 and FRP, *passim*.

<sup>129</sup>Joint Pub 3-08vI, *passim*.

augmenting a JTF staff and represent the areas of personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, civil-military operations, C4I, and legal operations.<sup>131</sup> Tier 2 is composed of Tier 1 personnel, plus liaison cells from the command's directorates. These LNOs monitor, coordinate, advise, participate in operation planning, and assist the command or agency to which they are attached. This pool of trained and educated professional LNOs is aligned with each of the LFAs supporting the FRP. The type of operations and the critical nodes requiring coverage will determine the number of LNOs deployed. Duty as LNO should be collateral duty, but personnel must be identified and designated in advance in order to train and qualify for these critical positions. Once activated, LNO duty becomes their primary

---

<sup>130</sup>The HQ section should be comprised of the (1) Chief, an 0-6 or 0-5, MEL 1 qualified, preferably a graduate from the School of Advanced Military Studies (either the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) or the Advanced Operational Arts Studies Fellowship (AOASF), (2) A deputy chief, an 0-5, with CGSC or equivalent (MEL 4) and JPME II qualification, and (3) a three-man administrative cell composed of an operations noncommissioned officer (graduate from a battle staff or equivalent course), and two communication specialists knowledgeable on intelligence and information systems (multiband, inter/intra team radio [MBITR], multiband, multi-mission radio [MBMMR], SOF signal intelligence manpack system, comparable with air/maritime platforms, INMARSAT and TACSAT).

<sup>131</sup>Tier 1 personnel should be 0-4 or higher, JPME II qualified, and assigned to permanent joint billets to ensure access to JPME courses and continuity in the replacement system. (1) *Personnel cell (J-1)*, knowledgeable on joint manpower management, formulation of personnel policies, supervision of the administration of personnel (including manning documents, replacements, etc.), joint personnel training and tracking activity (JPTTA), accountability, processing, and outward movement of forces, and joint reception center (JRC) operations, joint personnel status and casualty reporting (JPERSTAT), personnel estimates and JOPES. JP 1-0, *Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations* (1998), passim. (2) *Intelligence cell (J-2)*, knowledgeable on intelligence support to joint operations, joint IPB, intelligence cycle (planning and direction; collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination and integration), and enablers. Joint Pub 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations* (2000); JP 2-01, *Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations* (1996); JP 2-01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace*, (2000); JP 2-02, *National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations* (1998), and JP 2-03, *Joint TTPs for Geospatial Information and Services Support to Joint Operations* (1999), passim. (3) *Operations cell (J-3)*, knowledgeable on doctrine for joint planning and operations including campaign design and operational enablers. JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (2001); JP 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I and II* (1996); JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations* (1995); JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning* (2002), and JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures* (1999), passim. (4) *Logistics cell (J-4)*, knowledgeable on joint logistics doctrine and operations including logistic information systems and implementation of end-to-end combat support capability. Able to integrate existing information technologies (IT) with logistic automated information systems (AIS). Familiar with TTPs for joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) operations, and TPFDD. JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations* (2000), and JP 4-01, *Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System* (1997), passim. (5) *CMO cell*, knowledgeable on civil-military operations, including CMOC and JIC operations, JP 3-57, *Joint CMO Operations*, passim. (6) *Communications cell (J-6)*, knowledgeable on C4I functions and Global Combat Support System (GCSS COP-SE); able to facilitate integration and interoperability between combat support functions and command and control to support the operational needs of the JTF. JP 6-0, *Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations* (1995), and JP 6-02, *Doctrine for Employment of Operational/Tactical C4 Systems* (1995), passim. (7) *JAG officer*, knowledgeable on domestic, international, and operational law. *DOPLAW*, passim.

duty.<sup>132</sup> Tier 3 includes Tier 1 and selected personnel from Tier 2, plus subject matter experts (SME) in each of the six major MACA fields. As with the LNOs, the nature of the operation will determine the MACA specialty required to supporting the LFA.<sup>133</sup> Training, qualifications, and enabling tasks for each type of operation need to be ascertained in consultation with DODD 3025.15, *Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA)*, and in coordination with the LFA, which possesses the subject matter expertise in the particular field. Tier 3 provides the focus and functionally required to facilitating operations across the entire spectrum of military support to civil authorities.




Figure 10: NORTHCOM DJTFAC Task Organization (Rectangles, triangles, and hexagons are used only to accentuate and differentiate functions within the three-tier concept). Chart constructed by author.

<sup>132</sup> Liaison personnel must be thoroughly familiar with the capabilities and limitations of their parent units and Services, and the interagency they will support. Without these qualifications they are of little value to the gaining HQ. LNOs should be of sufficient rank (recommend equal rank of JTF primary staff officers) to influence the decision making process. Joint Pub 5-00.2, II-30.

<sup>133</sup> SMEs required are in the following areas: (1) Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA); (2) Military Assistance for Civil Disturbance (MADCIS); (3) Military Support to Law Enforcement (MSCLEA); (4) Sensitive Support (SS); (5) Counter Drug (CD); (6) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, High-Yield Explosions (CBRNE). DODD 3025.15, *passim*.

As a framework for further analysis, the DJTFAC should consider developing the following mission essential tasks: alert, marshal and deploy, conduct crisis action planning, conduct liaison duties; provide C4I augmentation, and sustain operations.<sup>134</sup> Furthermore, the *Universal Joint Task List* should be reviewed to determine critical joint tasks applicable to the DJTFAC, which could facilitate supporting a Joint Task Force (JTF) during CM operations.<sup>135</sup>

The development of a joint mission training plan for the DJTFAC - including detail breakdown of battle tasks under each essential task and correlation among individual, collective and leader tasks, as well as detailing the equipment, education and training, deployment, and sustainment standards for this organization - is outside the scope of this monograph.<sup>136</sup> However, these are critical components of making this DJTFAC fully operational and ready to accomplish its intended purpose and should be developed collaboratively with NORTHCOM's standing JTFs (JTF-CS and JTF-6), components likely to be designated as JTFs during CM support operations, and lead federal agencies (LFA) tasked to support the Federal Response Plan (FRP). These areas would have to be analyzed, properly structured, and resourced prior to the activation of the DJTFAC. In summary, Figure 11 illustrates the NORTHCOM's DJTFAC design process (interaction of structure, function, and process as they relate to stakeholder expectations, environment dynamics, purpose, input, critical processes, and output) as discussed in this section.

---

<sup>134</sup>For discussion on METL development see Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 7-0 (FM 25-100), *Training The Force* (HQDA, October 2002), 38-51 (on-line); available from <http://www.army.mil/features/FM7/FM%207-0.PDF>; internet; accessed 24 December 2002.

<sup>135</sup>The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) provides a menu of capabilities (mission-derived tasks with associated conditions and standards (e.g. the tools) that may be selected by a joint force commander to accomplish the assigned mission. Once identified as essential to mission accomplishment, these tasks are reflected within the command's joint mission essential task list. DOD, CJCSM 3500.04C, *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)* (Washington, D.C., 2002), passim; available from <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/u/05539.html>; internet; accessed 24 December 2002.

<sup>136</sup>For discussion on developing training programs see FM 7-0, *Training The Force*; Chapter 4 (Planning), Chapter 5 (Executing), and Chapter 6 (Assessing), passim.




Figure 11: NORTHCOM DJTFAC Design Process. Chart constructed by author.

In closing, in the complex and dynamic NORTHCOM's AOR, a rapidly deployable, trained and educated, joint staff augmentation cell will increase effectiveness and efficiency in a standing or designated JTF by enhancing flexibility, interoperability, and unity of effort during the conduct of CM operations in support of a lead federal agency (LFA).<sup>137</sup>

<sup>137</sup> Although the DJTFAC is a viable tool and a JTF's force multiplier during CM support operations, the unified command must remain flexible and prepared to provide additional functional and LNO support outside the resident capabilities of the DJTFAC. These additional requirements, if needed, must be identified during mission analysis.

## SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

### ***U.S. Government Documents, Manuals and Reports***

AFSC Pub 1, *The Joint Officer's Staff Guide 1997*. Norfolk, VA: National Defense University, Armed Forces Staff College, 2000.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. *Federal Response Plan for Public Law 93-288*, as Amended. Washington, D.C., April 1992.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3500.04B, *Universal joint Task List*. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1 October 1999.

\_\_\_\_\_. Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 24 February 1995.

\_\_\_\_\_. Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, September 2001.

\_\_\_\_\_. Joint Pub 3-57, *Joint Civil-Military Operations*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 8 February 2001.

\_\_\_\_\_. Joint Pub 3-08vI, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I*, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 9 October 1996.

\_\_\_\_\_. Joint Pub 3-08vII, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume II*, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 9 October 1996.

\_\_\_\_\_. Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1 February 1995.

\_\_\_\_\_. Joint Pub 5-002, *Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 13 January 1999.

Joint Task Force Andrew. "Joint Task Force Andrew After Action Report, Volume I: Overview Executive Summary." Miami, Florida: Joint Task Force Andrew, 15 October 1992.

Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS). "Joint Task Force Andrews, JULLS # 91425-63795 (00005), 91426-81149 (00001), 91427-67150 (00007), 91517-25649 (00009), 91518-15758 (00010), 92352-55018 (00012)". Center for Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 10 September 1992.

Second United States Army. "Joint Task Force Andrew -Lessons Learned." Memorandum for Commander, U.S. Command and General Staff College, Center for Army Lessons Learned. Fort Gillem/Forest Park, Georgia: Headquarters, Second U.S. Army, 14 December 1992.



- U.S. Atlantic Command. *Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) Standing Operating Procedures (SOP)*. Norfolk, Virginia: USACOM, 15 January 1997.
- U. S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 500-60, Disaster Relief*. Washington, D.C., 1 August 1991.
- U.S. Department of Defense. Department of Defense Directive 3025.15, *Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA)*. Washington, D.C., 23 January 1993.
- U.S. Pacific Command. *Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) Standing Operating Procedures (SOP)*. Honolulu, Hawaii, 1998.
- U.S. Public Law 93-288, *The Disaster Relief Act of 1974*, Washington, D.C., 22 May 1974.  
U.S. Public Law 93-288, as amended by Public Law 100-707. *Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act*, reprinted by the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
- U.S. Southern Command. SC Regulation 10-6, *Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) Standing Operating Procedures (SOP)*. Miami, Florida: USSOUTHCOM, 1 April 1998.

### **Books**

- Gharajedachi, Jamshid, *Systems Thinking, Managing Chaos and Complexity: A Platform for Designing Business Architecture*, Butterworth-Heinemann, Woburn, MA, 1999.
- Graham, David W., *Domestic Operational Law (DOPLAW) Handbook for Judge Advocates.*, Center for Law and Military Operations., Charlottesville, Virginia, 15 April 2001.
- Waldrop, Mitxhell, *Complexity*, Touchstone, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1992.

### **Monographs**

- Algermissen, Robert M., "Humanitarian Assistance Response Ready Forces.", School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas., 19 May 1995.
- Crook, Kenneth R. "The Department of Defense's Preparation to Support Domestic Emergencies as A U.S. Vital Interest.", U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 2000.
- Ferguson, Ian., "Joint Task Force Civil-Support: Are We on the Right Track?", Naval War College, Newport, Richmond, Virginia., 5 February 2001.
- Geczy III, George., "Joint Task Force Design in Operations Other Than War." School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas., 14 December 1995.

Gehler, Christopher P., "Organization for Planning: The Corps-to-JTF Contingency Operation Scenario." School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas., 15 May 2000.

Hanley, James N., "Permanent or Temporary Levels of Command?", School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas., 23 May 1995.

Meadows III, Plaudy M., "Are Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters the Initial Step in Transforming Cold War Formations?" School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas., 14 May 2002.

Metz, John M., "Making Organizations Talk: An Assessment of Military-Interagency Interoperability." School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command And General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas., 19 April 1996.

Smart, A.G., "Military Support to Domestic Relief Doctrine for Operations in the Wake of the Enemy?" School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas., 14 May 1993.

### ***Articles, Papers and Reports***

Aguila Joint Information Bureau Release. "Operation Fuerte Apoyo Wraps Up Mission." *Army News Service*, Feb. 11, 1999 (on-line); available from <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/mitch.htm>; accessed 2 October 2002.

Bloomfield, Jr., Lincoln P. "Challenges in the Post-9/11 World " Remarks at Conference on the War on Terrorism French Senate, Paris, France", September 11, 2002 (on-line); available from <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/2002/13543.htm>; accessed 1 October 2002.

Birkland, Thomas A., "Natural Disasters as Focusing Events: Policy Communities and Political Response," *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*, Volume 19, No. 1, (March 2001), 221-243. (on-line); available from <http://www.usc.edu/schools/sppd/ijmed/v13n3.html>; accessed 21 December 2002.

Brown, Alan L. "Jointness Begins at Home –Responding to Domestic Incidents." *Joint Force Quarterly*. Spring 1999, pp.106-111.

Claude Gilbert, "Studying Disaster: A Review of the Main Conceptual Tools," *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*, Volume 13, No. 3 (November 1995), 231-240 (on-line); available from <http://www.usc.edu/schools/sppd/ijmed/v13n3.html>; accessed 19 December 2002.

Department of Defense. "Disaster Assistance: DOD's Support for Hurricane Andrew and Typhoons Iniki and Omar: Report to Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives" (undated).

DOD News Brief. "Gen. Wilhiem's Briefing on U.S. Military Relief Effort for Hurricane Mitch November 19, 1998." (on-line); available from [http://www.fas.org/man/dod-01/ops/docs/t11231998\\_t119mtch.html](http://www.fas.org/man/dod-01/ops/docs/t11231998_t119mtch.html); accessed 1 October 2002.

Department of State. "Consequence Management and Military Personnel." (on-line); available from <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/iso/cm/>; accessed 1 October 2002.

Doubleday, Mike. "DoD News Briefing on Hurricane Mitch Assistance." *FAS*, November 25, 1998 (on-line); available from [http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs/t11251998\\_t1125mit.html](http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs/t11251998_t1125mit.html); accessed 3 October 2002.

Driscoll, Paul and Michael B. Salwen, "Riding Out the Storm: Public Evaluations of News Coverage of Hurricane Andrew," *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*, 293-303 (on-line); available from <http://www.usc.edu/schools/sppd/ijmed/v13n3.html>; accessed 23 December 2002.

Eckstein, Jeff. "Operation Fuerte Apoyo: Disaster Relief Operations in Nicaragua.." *Engineer Bulletin* November 1999 (on-line); available from <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs99/991100-eckstein.htm>; accessed 3 October 2002.

FAS. "Operation Fuerte Apoyo (Strong Support), Hurricane Mitch," Military Analysis Network. Dec 98 (on-line); available from <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/mitch.htm>. accessed 2 October 2002.

Garamone, Jim, "DoD Forms "Eagle Force" to Expand Mitch Relief." *American Forces Press Service*, 30 November 1998 (on-line); available from <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/mitch.htm>; accessed 1 October 2002.

\_\_\_\_\_. "U.S. Northern Command to Debut in October." *American Forces Press Service*, 17 April 2002.

\_\_\_\_\_. "U.S. Northern Command Setup Becomes Clearer." *American Forces Press Service*, 14 August 2002.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Task Force Prepares for Consequence Management." *DefenseLink*. US Department of Defense, 25 Jan 02 (on-line); available from [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/n01252002\\_200201252.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/n01252002_200201252.html); accessed 1 October 2002.

Gordon R. Sullivan., "Hurricane Andrew: An After-Action Report.." *Army*, Vol 43., No. 1 (January 1993), pp. 16-22.

Hamblet, William P. and Jerry G. Kline. "Interagency Cooperation: PDD 56 and Complex Contingency Operations." *Joint Force Quarterly*. Spring 2000, pp. 92-97.

Haskell, Bob. "Northcom Chief: Guard Key to Homeland Defense." *Army Link News* (on-line); available from <http://www.dtic/srmylink/news>; accessed 14 September 2002.

Holder, Robert W. "Consequence Management: A Ninety Day Look Back On The Impact Of The September 11 Terrorist Attacks On Governments" EDS. Government Global Industry Group. 1997 (on-line); available from <http://www.fema.gov/rrr/conplan/conpln1e.shtm#FEMA>; accessed 2 October 2002.

Horlick-Jones, Tom, "Modern Disasters as Outrage and Betrayal," *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*, Volume 13, No. 3 (November 1995), 305-315 (on-line); available from <http://www.usc.edu/schools/sppd/ijmed/v13n3.html>; accessed 19 December 2002.

Hurricane Mitch. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) (on-line); available from <http://www.osei.noaa.gov/mitch.html>; accessed 2 October 2002.

Kory, Dolores N., "Coordinating Intergovernmental Policies on Emergency Management in a Multi-Centered Metropolis," *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (March 1998), 45-54 (on-line); available from <http://www.usc.edu/schools/sppd/ijmed/v13n3.html>; accessed 19 December 2002.

Niwla, Gail and Jim P. Ballard. "Joint Task Forces: A Bibliography". *Joint Force Quarterly*. Autumn/Winter 94/95, pp. 1-9.

Russell, James. "NORTHCOM to Coordinate DoD Role in Homeland Defense" Center for Contemporary Conflict. 6 May 02 (on-line); available from <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/rsep/resources/si/may02/homeland.asp>; accessed 3 October 2002.

Seiple, Chris. "Consequence Management: Domestic Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction." US Army War College, *Parameters*, Autumn 1997, pp. 119-34 (on-line); available from <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters>; accessed on 1 October 2002.

Seiple, Chris, "Consequence Management, Institute for Global Engagement;" (on-line); available from <http://www.globalengagement.org/issues/2001/10/cseiple-wmd.htm>; accessed 2 October 2002.

Seydlitz, Ruth, J., William Spencer, Shirley Laska, and Elizabeth Triche. "The Effects of Newspaper Reports on the Public's Response to a Natural Hazard Event," *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters* Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 1991), 5-29 (online); available from <http://www.usc.edu/schools/sppd/ijmed/v13n3.html>; accessed 23 December 2002.

Russell, James. "NORTHCOM to Coordinate DoD Role in Homeland Defense" *Center for Contemporary Conflict*, 6 May 02 (on-line); available from <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/rsepResources/si/may02/homeland.asp>; accessed 3 October 2002.

Troth, Jeff. "U.S. Relief Effort Continues in Honduras", *Air Force News*, 30 Nov 1998 (on-line); available from [http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs/n19981130\\_981852.html](http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs/n19981130_981852.html); accessed 2 October 2002.

### **Briefings**

La Crosse, Thomas. "Directorate of Military Support (DOMS) Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA)." PowerPoint presentation, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; 15 September 2002.

Prevett, Dennis. "Federal Response to Terrorism (FEMA Region II) MACA." PowerPoint presentation, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; 22 September 2002.